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Abstract 
This thesis investigates negotiation processes during strategic alliance formations between 
venture capital firms and start-up companies by empirically assessing previous literature on 
negotiation theory and further developing the understanding of fairness theory. The lack of 
empirical evidence surrounding alliances between venture capital firms and start-up companies is 
the basis for this research. Cross-sectional data have been obtained from seven different 
successful cases of short-term investments in the IT industry to further this endeavor. The roles 
of distributive, procedural, interpersonal and informational fairness in negotiations of strategic 
alliance formation are analyzed based on interview data. The results indicate that the higher the 
venture capitalists perceive fairness, the more likely the strategic alliance formations will be 
successful. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The concept of strategic alliances was first proposed by J. Hopland and R. Nigel in the 20th 
century (Yao, 2003). Hopland and Nigel defined strategic alliances as an agreement involving 
two or more organizations for achieving joint strategic goals in order to meet their business 
needs. Over the last two decades, this business strategy has caught the attention of academic 
scholars who then showed research interests in this area. At the same time, establishing strategic 
alliances is becoming one of the most central strategies for firms to develop their business 
(Hamel et al., 1989), which could help firms to conserve resources and share risks (Harrigan, 
1988). Extensive research exists on joint ventures, nonequity alliances, and minority equity 
alliances (Keller, 1988), but no specific research exists on the business relationship between VCs 
and entrepreneurs. In this thesis, the relationship between the venture capital firm and the start-
up company is defined as a minority equity alliance, which is characterized by one firm investing 
in another company and holds ownership shares in that company. However, as this definition is 
hard to apply on the VC’s side since their involvement in the start-up company is weak (see p.7-
8), we apply this definition from the start-up company's perspective. This thesis investigates why 
the business relationship can be defined as a strategic alliance and examines the formation phase 
of strategic alliances and the negotiation decision making process between VCs and 
entrepreneurs.   
 
Initially, negotiation theory was involved in the social psychological study based on decision-
making processes between negotiators (Druckman, 1977). With the development of few decades, 
negotiation theory has been widely used in various fields, such as law, commercial trade and 
social communication. During the negotiation process, it is inevitable that conflicts will emerge.  
Therefore, negotiation strategies are defined as mechanisms to manage different conflicts 
effectively (Das & Kumar, 2011). Considering the development of forming alliances to expand 
business, some scholars have paid attention to applying negotiation strategies in the field of 
alliance. The dual concern model proposed by Pruitt (1983), suggests that negotiators should 
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think about four alternative strategies to manage conflicts, namely “problem solving”, 
“contending”, “yielding” and “inaction” based on the concern for one’s own outcomes versus 
other’s outcomes. Das and Kumar (2011) suggests other similar alternative strategies, namely 
“problem solving”, “contending”, “yielding”, and “compromising”, which is more suitable for 
the situation of negotiation in strategic alliances. 
 
From numerous academic studies, it is found that negotiation is influenced by many factors. 
Traditionally, researchers almost exclusively focused on the efficiency properties of both the 
process and the outcomes of a negotiation (Carraro, Marchiori & Sgobbi, 2005). Albin (1992) is 
the first scholar who pointed out that fairness plays an important role in negotiations. According 
to Colquitt’s (2001) study, fairness is best conceptualized as four distinct dimensions: procedural 
fairness, distributive fairness, interpersonal fairness, and informational fairness. Fairness theory 
was first used in the research on the fairness among people. Luo (2005) started to utilize fairness 
theory to study the fairness among organizations in the formation of strategic alliance. Following 
Luo’s (2005) research, Ariño and Ring (2010) use fairness theory to conduct another study on 
the joint venture alliance formation. Apart from these researchers, the application of fairness 
theory in the formation phase of strategic alliance did not draw the attention of other researchers 
and lacks further academic literatures. As this research field has received sparse attention, this 
thesis is influenced and encouraged to investigate this topic. 
  
Although the significance of negotiation theory and fairness theory has been well acknowledged 
during the last decades, few researches focus on using both of these theories to analyze strategic 
alliances in the formation phase. Therefore, the motivation behind the research of investigating 
how fairness influences alliance formation is based on this fact. 
 
1.2 Objectives and research question  
The first motivation of this thesis is our ambitions to become future entrepreneurs which require 
us to understand the venture capital industry. The second motivation stems from suggestions by 
our supervisors who encouraged us to further investigate the fairness theory. Last, the scarcity of 
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empirical assessment on effects of different negotiation strategies in strategic alliance formation 
leaves opportunity for further investigation. 
 
Main research objectives are showed as follows: 
1. to examine the current successful alliances by utilizing the fairness theory and  the 
negotiation theory 
2. to provide entrepreneurs an insight of venture capital negotiation process and VCs’ 
thoughts during the process   
 
The research question has been changed several times. On the basis of the high failure rate of 
forming alliance which is between 30% and 70% (Bamford & Gomes-Casseres, 2004), the first 
proposed research question was: What are the significant factors that lead to a successful 
alliance? However, this research question did not show insights of how these factors determine 
outcomes of the entire alliance. Therefore, the second version of the research question was 
presented as: How do significant factors affect the entire alliances process?  
 
Review of previous literature and testing interview data has been gathered, providing more 
understanding of the whole process by which to establish alliances between venture capitalist 
firms and start-up companies. Both literature review and data collection helped us to develop our 
final research question. Considering the short time period, it is difficult to elaborate the whole 
process of alliances. Therefore, this study will only focus on the alliances formation phase.  
 
The negotiation strategy is an important factor that can influence the success of forming alliances. 
However, current studies of empirical assessment on the effects of different negotiation 
strategies in the phase of alliances formation remain sparse. For example, one of the latest 
studies about applying negotiation strategy in the research field of alliance conducted by Das and 
Kumar (2011) primarily focuses on the theoretical development, as he said: “the purpose of this 
paper is propose a strategic framework for understanding inter-partner negotiation dynamics in 
alliances”. One of the limitations of his study is the lack of empirical assessment to prove the 
strategic framework. This thesis is primarily motivated to increase deeper understanding of 
empirical effects of the strategic framework arising from this limitation.  
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Furthermore, with the development of fairness theory, more researchers utilize this theory to 
analyze the insights of alliances. For instance, Ariño and Ring (2010) investigate the theory of 
distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational fairness in a failed international joint 
venture case to analyze the roles of their occurrence during the alliance formation phase. 
However, the lack of multiple-case studies of successful alliance formations constrains his 
research to some extent. Therefore, the question of how fairness theory works in successful 
alliance cases has been raised. All these limitations encourage this thesis to propose its research 
question: How do perceptions of fairness affect negotiation outcomes during strategic alliance 
formation between VC firms and start-up companies?  
 
1.3 Delimitation 
Given that it is very difficult to access an ongoing negotiation process between VCs and 
entrepreneurs, the longitudinal design was not suitable for this research. The time limitations of 
the research hindered the researchers’ ability to perform a time-series study. Thus, the cross-
sectional design was selected for this study. As Wilson (2010) mentioned, the cross-sectional 
design is less time-consuming and less expensive than a longitudinal study.     
 
Short term investment cases of IT industry at the early stage were chosen as the research objects 
in this study. But it is noticeable that this study mainly focused on the successful cases. Failed 
cases were introduced in interviews and mentioned in the case presentations, but the in-depth 
analysis for these failed cases was not conducted in this study.  
 
1.4 Chapter outline 
The master thesis is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter 1- Introduction briefly introduces the background of this study as well as the research 
objectives and research question. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature review provides an extensive literature overview of strategic alliance 
formation, negotiation theory, and fairness theory. This chapter also acknowledges several 
researchers who have conducted their studies related to our chosen study topic. 
 
Chapter 3 - Methodology describes the research design, research methods, and data analysis. 
Case study was chosen to analyze our research. This is then followed by research methods which 
consist of research setting and data collection. In the data analysis section, new findings are 
presented. 
 
Chapter 4 - Case presentations provides an overview of negotiation process in strategic 
alliance formation, elaborates on each interview, and presents the data by focusing on fairness, 
negotiation strategy and other coded concepts. 
 
Chapter 5 - Discussion of findings discusses the new findings of our research and interprets 
these findings by implementing previous literature. In addition, both proposed framework and 
propositions are illustrated in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 6 - Conclusion summarizes our findings and concludes the contributions of our 
research. Limitations and future research are also discussed. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1 Alliances 
2.1.1 The concept of Alliances 
Linkages between firms have existed since the establishment of the very first companies. These 
linkages could be for example trading partners where necessary resources or services are 
provided to one another to enhance the firms’ business performance. In the last two decades, the 
concept of alliances has influenced the business world greatly and has paved the way for many 
start-up companies and introduced them to another dimension in the competitive business world. 
There are many different ways to define the term alliance since it has been used in different 
settings, but the core meaning of the term can be described as a cooperative relationship between 
two independent entities who work under an informal contract (Reuer et al., 2011). An informal 
contract is a contract that does not necessarily have all the terms specified in advance, but where 
firms use open-ended contracts to govern their business relationship (Reuer et al, 2011). 
 
On a deeper level, strategic alliance is a term that has been used considerably in the academia 
and in the business world in the recent years and differs from the original term (alliance). 
Because a range of various definitions exists on the strategic alliance term, Yoshino and Rangan 
(1996) created three characteristics for the strategic alliance definition: (1) firms remain 
independent after the alliance formation, (2) partner firms share the benefits and control over the 
performance of assigned tasks, and (3) partner firms contribute in one or more key strategic areas 
(e.g. technology, market, and customers) on a regular basis. Therefore, strategic alliance can be 
formulated as a formal relationship between independent firms on a longer-term basis where 
they agree to work together to enhance the competitive advantage by discovering and creating 
new possibilities and exploiting new skills and resources. Even though alliance takes different 
forms, there are some similarities that draw upon them. J. Peter Keller (1988) proposed three 
different types of strategic alliance: joint ventures, nonequity alliances, and minority equity 
alliances. A joint venture is a newly incorporated company created by two or more firms where 
every partner has an ownership and representation on the board of directors. Nonequity alliance 
is an agreement to cooperate in some way between two partners where no new entity is being 
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created or any equity holdings between partners. Minority equity alliance resembles nonequity 
alliance in that partners agrees on a business relationship without creating a new company, but 
where one partners holds an equity in the partner firm. Figure 2.1 illustrates these three types of 
strategic alliances. 
 
 
Figure 2. 1 An overview of three types of strategic alliances 
 
Based on the knowledge of alliance, the investment between a venture capital firm and a start-up 
company as a strategic alliance is defined. From hereby, venture capital will be referred to as VC 
and venture capitalists as VCs. It is argued that this relationship fulfills the criteria provided by 
Yoshino and Rangan (1996). The reasons are as following: 
 
(1)   Firms remain independent after the alliance formation 
The start-up company still remains independent after the investment even though the VC 
firm holds a certain amount of share in the company. 
 
8 
 
(2)   Partner firms share the benefits and control over the performance of assigned 
tasks 
The entrepreneur and the VC firm can discover new possibilities and perform certain task 
together where both parties can benefit from the outcome. 
 
(3)   Partner firms contribute in one or more key strategic areas (e.g. technology, 
market, and so on) on a regular basis 
      Besides from providing capital, VCs can also give advice and provide resources. 
 
In the light of these elaborations, the relationship between the venture capital firm and the start-
up company is defined as a strategic alliance and specifically as a minority equity alliance. 
However, as this definition is hard to apply on the VC’s side since their involvement in criteria 2 
is weak. We determine this definition from the start-up company's perspective. 
 
From here on, the alliances between VCs and entrepreneurs will be referred to as strategic 
alliances. 
 
2.1.2 Investment criteria         
To broaden our understanding of the venture capitalist world, how VCs make investment 
decisions is looked into. The starting point is based on the criteria VCs use to evaluate a potential 
investment. The reason for looking into this topic is to understand which sections VCs and 
entrepreneurs negotiate about and which sections are more important than others. Also, this is 
used as preparation for the interview with the investors. It is believed that many of these points 
mentioned under will also be topics that the investors will elaborate on during the interview. The 
fairness theory and negotiation strategies are used later to interpret the relationship between the 
VCs and entrepreneurs. This literature is based on the findings done by Fried and Hisrich (1994) 
where they found fifteen criteria common for VC investments. Their criteria expand the three 
basic fundamentals (see Table 2.1 of Investment criteria) defined by Hisrich and Jankowicz 
(1990): concept, management, and return. 
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Table 2. 1 Investment criteria 
Concept describes the requirements for the business idea and consists of four elements: 
A potential for growth of earnings (for example, growing market, extend market share or 
reduce costs). 
A business idea that is ready to go to market or can brought to market within 2 to 3 years. 
The idea must offer a competitive advantage or be in a non-competitive industry. 
A reasonable capital requirement for the idea 
Management describes the attributes that VCs wish to see in managers: 
Personal integrity 
Good track records (earlier work experience) 
Realistic  - be able to identify risks and develop plan for dealing with these risks 
Hard working 
Flexible 
Understand the business on an in-depth level 
Possess leadership skills to handle both good times and pressure 
General management experience 
Return (exit): 
Provide an exit opportunity (for example by public offerings, sale of the company or buyback 
by the company)     
Potential for a high rate of return 
Offer a potential for a high absolute return 
 
2.1.3 Investment decision making process 
By looking into investment decision making criteria, an understanding of what VCs emphasizes 
during the negotiations with entrepreneurs is created. According to several researchers, the 
venture capitalists go through a number of stages during the decision making process. These 
various findings agrees that an investment decision making process consist of five to six stages 
(Wells 1974, Tyebjee & Bruno 1984, Silver 1985, Hall 1989), see Table 2.2. Fried and Hisrich 
(1994), who carried out the research on investment criteria, also did a research on decision 
making process. Their presentation of the findings resembles the earlier findings discovered by 
various researchers. Their main difference is the last (sixth) stage. Fried and Hisrich (1994) 
described it as the closing stage where the VCs decides to or not invest, while earlier researchers 
refer their last stage to cashing out as in exiting the company. According to Fried and Hisrich 
(1994), an investment negotiation takes an average of 97.1 days to pass through the six stages. 
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Table 2. 2 Stages of negotiation process
1
 
 
 
It is decided in this thesis to include this topic because the investment decision making process is 
very similar to the alliance forming process and is also one of the reasons why the investment 
between a VC firm and a start-up company as an alliance is defined. The five stages in the 
investment decision making process will be outlined and a brief comparison with the alliance 
formation process will be made. A combination of the processes defined by Wells (1974), 
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984), Silver (1985), Hall (1989), and Fried and Hisrich (1994) will be used 
when describing the stages, but for the last (fifth) stage Fried and Hisrich (1994) (see Appendix 1) 
is used as reference because it has the closest resemblance with the alliance forming process. 
 
 Stage 1 Deal search 
VCs get new deals through several ways; some deals come in from referrals, many are sent by 
emails, and some VCs meet the entrepreneur at seminars and conferences. 
 
 Stage 2 Screening 
VCs review the incoming investment proposals (often an executive summary and/or a business 
plan) based on their own criteria on investment size, industry, geography, location, and stage of 
financing. Proposals that don’t meet the criteria will be eliminated. 
 
                                               
1
 Source: Hall & Hofer (1993), p. 28 
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 Stage 3 Evaluation 
During this stage, the VCs breaks down the business plan in part and tries to understand the 
business model. The VCs does extensive research on the technology, market, management team, 
and so on by hiring external experts to do evaluations. VCs consult their network for advices and 
to check for potential customers or suppliers. The entrepreneur is to lay out the financial 
projections. This is the stage where the VCs perform the due diligence. 
 
 Stage 4 Deal structuring 
During this phase, the VCs may have developed an emotional tie to the proposal. This is also 
where they decide whether to invest or not. During this phase, the VCs and entrepreneur do the 
number crunching on the value of the company, ownership shares, return on exit, and so on. 
Legal documents are formed where they negotiate the terms and condition and do changes if the 
parties are not satisfied with the proposed terms, for example, the VC wants to change the 
management team. This is the term sheet phase, where the heavy negotiation takes place. 
 
 Stage 5 Closing 
In the last phase of the process where negotiation over the terms and condition are over and 
where legal documents are signed. After the signing of the deal, the company receives the money. 
 
2.1.4 Stages of alliance formation 
The formation of an alliance has been researched on for several decades. Earlier researchers 
concluded that there are several stages in an alliance formation which have key factors that are 
important for a successful outcome of the negotiation of a deal (Gulati 1998)/ (Borch, 1994; 
Kanter, 1994; Larson, 1992). The development process models provided by the different 
researchers’ range from a five-stage model to a seven-stage model, where the stages are 
organized in phases, see Appendix 2. When analyzing these models, it is recognized that the 
formation phase has some resemblance with the investment decision making process. 
 
The formation phase consists of all the stages that exist in the investment decision making 
process. During the alliance formation phase, it is found that the partner locating and selection 
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stage, where they search for potential partners and select the right partner to cooperate with. The 
next stage is engagement, where the partners learns about each other and learn about the business, 
and evaluations.  The fourth stage is negotiation and the last stage is where they decide whether 
to cooperate or not. 
 
The comparison of the negotiation decision making process and the alliance formation phase is 
illustrated in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2. 3 Comparison table between investment decision making process and alliance formation 
phase
2
 
 
According to Das and Kumar (2011), the negotiation of an agreement between the potential 
partners is the central issue at the phase of alliance formation. Further literature review regarding 
negotiation is illustrated below. 
 
                                               
2
 Based on: Das & Teng, (2002), Hall & Hofer (1993) 
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2.2 Negotiation theory 
2.2.1 The concept of negotiation 
Negotiation theory is a social psychological study that looks at decision-making processes 
between negotiators (Druckman, 1977). It seeks to identify the variables that determine the 
outcome of negotiations, bargaining power, and power relations by using game theory
3
 (Carraro, 
2005). Negotiation theory has been developed for a few decades that involve many researchers. 
Druckman (1977), Bazerman and Neale (1992), Pruitt and Carnevale (1993), and Zartman (1994) 
have made a great contribution for the negotiation theory development. Major parts of the 
negotiation theory concern the details of decision-making during the process of bargaining and 
mediation (Pruitt, 2001). Much of the negotiation theory has the same notion of negotiation as a 
communication process by two or more parties, but quite different in the description of the 
processes. For example, structural analysis emphasizes on the perspective of power during this 
process; game theory or strategic analysis considers this process as a repetition of games; 
integrative analysis describes this process as successive procedures
4
. 
 
Negotiation was defined as an interactive communication process by two or more parties who 
need to find an optimized way to coordinate their behaviors (Korobkin, 2002). It is frequently 
used in different social activities in order to make an agreement. According to the book of 
Negotiation: Theory and Strategy (2002), there are three main steps in the negotiating process. 
First, it begins with pre bargaining preparation. Then during the communication phrase, 
negotiators exchange information, make offers and counteroffers. In the end, the bargaining 
interaction concludes with reaching an agreement or not. Negotiating in this order is a very 
common process. However, in real life negotiation process, negotiators would like to undertake a 
different order. For example, during our interviews with investors, some interviewees chose to 
propose an offer to the entrepreneur before entering the pre bargaining phase. It is not so hard to 
understand their choice, because they do not want to lose the opportunity of a good investment. 
                                               
3
 Game theory is the study of strategic decision making. More formally, it is the study of mathematical models of 
conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers 
(source:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory). 
4
 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negotiation_theory 
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In order to understand the complex process of negotiation, it requires the development of 
conceptual frameworks. The following articles are focusing on this purpose. 
 
Carrie Menkel Meadow (1983) published her paper on the problem solving structure in the 
negotiation. She presents two types of negotiations: problem solving negotiation and adversarial 
negotiation, which depends on if negotiators intend to use bargaining to make both parties better 
off or gain benefits at the cost of their opponent (Korobkin, 2002). Russell Korobkin (2000) 
suggested that negotiations could be classified as “zone definition” and “surplus allocation” 
(Korobkin, 2000). In his framework, he uses the concept of tactics that are defined by if they 
help negotiators to understand the “parameters” of bargaining zone or allocate the cooperative 
surplus in order to make progress for both sides (Korobkin, 2002). Some parts of negotiation 
theory are relevant to only one type of negotiation, while others cut across all types of 
negotiation (Pruitt, 2001). Ripeness theory describes the conditions under which negotiation will 
begin, covering all types of negotiation, which helps us to understand how negotiation theory 
works in different kinds of negotiation (Zartman 1989, 1996, 1997). 
 
Given that negotiation is a dynamic and interactive process, the final agreement or success 
highly depends on negotiators’ ability to understand their opponents’ needs and respond to their 
negotiating methods. With years of practice in the negotiation process, negotiators will probably 
handle different issues in any situation that might threaten the success of negotiation. However, it 
is necessary to conclude theoretical approaches that help negotiators to better understand the 
structure of negotiation and the principles of negotiating approach, which could enable 
negotiators to become more effective bargainers. Therefore, Korobkin (2002) attempts to provide 
a manageable analytical framework in his book based on strategic goals. After analyzing the 
negotiating process from a structural perspective, he thinks negotiators always attempt to find the 
bargaining zone and try to expand it in order to enlarge their cooperative surplus for the 
agreement (Korobkin, 2002). 
 
In addition, Korobkin also presents some analytical categories which can be used to organize the 
negotiation dynamics, such as negotiators’ dilemma and conflict style (Korobkin, 2002). 
Negotiator's dilemma describes the situation of whether to share information with opposing 
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negotiators freely or not. This is one of the most critical strategic choices that negotiators have to 
make. During our interviews with investors, some of them suggest that entrepreneurs should be 
honest and freely share relevant information with them, which are very crucial to support the 
effective negotiation process. On the other side, conflicts will deeply affect the negotiation 
process. Conflicts during the negotiation process may arise from psychological or behavioral 
dissatisfaction, which could cause negotiators to become defensive or offensive. As a result, it 
will be hard to be rational during the following negotiating steps. 
 
2.2.2 Conflict 
Conflict occurs when “disagreements exist in a social situation over issues of substance” 
(Schermerhorn, 2003), which is inevitable to avoid during the negotiation process. Early conflict 
researchers, such as Mack and Snyder (1957) defined conflict as “a particular kind of social 
interaction process between parties who have mutually exclusive or incompatible values” (Mack, 
1957, P.212). Although there were many similar views about conflict processes, many argued the 
importance of conflict outcomes (Schmidt & Kochan, 1972; Pondy 1967).  With the 
development of social science, more and more researchers paid attention to other definitional 
contrasts of conflict, such as the objectives versus perceived incompatibility of actions (Hocker 
& Wilmot, 1985).   
 
When negotiators move into the negotiation process, they need to cope with different types of 
conflicts. According to Schermerhorn’s definition of conflict, there are two main types of 
conflicts: Substantive and Emotional. Substantive conflict is “a fundamental disagreement over 
ends or goals to be pursued and the means for their accomplishment” (Schermerhorn, 2003). 
Emotional conflict arises from interpersonal difficulties of personality differences. Harinck 
(1999) and other researchers believe that negotiation itself is to discuss and resolve differences 
which might be traced back to interest conflicts in scare resources, intellective problems (e.g., 
“what is the right answer?”) or evaluative problems (e.g., “what is good or bad?”) (Coombs, 
1987; De Dreu, Harinck, & Van Vianen, 1999; Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Kelley & 
Thibaut, 1969; Laughlin, 1980; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986; Levine & Thompson, 1996). Therefore, 
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the question of how to solve these conflicts has appeared. The negotiation strategies are 
mechanisms to manage different conflicts effectively (Das & Kumar, 2011). 
2.2.3 Negotiation strategy 
Previous literatures demonstrate different perspectives on how to manage conflicts. In terms of 
disputants’ endeavors, for many reasons, such as “the net cost of the conflict becomes 
unacceptably high, resources are depleted, goals change, and new alternatives surface” 
(Blalock, 1989), they attempt to manage conflicts. Table 2.4 shows some operations that 
disputants performed. 
 
Table 2. 4 Disputants’ Conflict Management Tactics5 
Prescriptive 
Be aware of the conflict causes and results 
Note the alternatives 
Take steps to deal with the causes, conflict and results 
Attempt to change the other, the conditions, and one’s own behavior 
Improve mood 
Express disagreement in a reasonable fashion 
Link actions to positive goals 
Openly discuss opposing views 
Address dispute concomitantly from own and opponent’s position 
Hold to functional values 
GRIT 
Descriptive 
(The above prescriptive approaches can also be included in this category) 
Violence and competitive use of force 
Agree to symbols of defeat 
Compromise 
Convert the opponent 
Totalist: attempts to completely beat the opponent 
Totalist approach with interim agreements 
Deterrence plus punishment 
Mixed, firm but cooperative approach 
Conciliation 
Latent acceptance, accommodation 
Forcing 
Avoiding 
Compromising 
Problem-solving (collaboration) 
 
                                               
5
 Source: James A. Wall (1995) 
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In terms of prescriptive statements, Deutsch suggested that disputants should be firstly aware of 
the causes and consequences of conflict and alternatives to it (Deutsch, 1990). After that, 
disputants need to cope with the causes of conflict, the conflict itself and its effects step by step. 
Similarly, Hocker and Wilmot pay more attention to the causes of conflict, but less attention to 
interpersonal dynamics (Hocker, 1991). They think that disputants should change their own 
behaviors, the conflict conditions, and their opponents’ behaviors. Kottler (1994) thinks that 
disputants should focus on their own responsibility and prevent to blame others. Eiseman and 
Gray demonstrate a type of integrative thinking in which disputants think about the conflict 
concomitantly from their own perspective as well as their opponents’ (Eiseman, 1978; Gray 
1985). They also emphasize the value of openness, integrity and justice (Wall, 1995).  GRIT 
(Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction) approach is advocated by Osgood 
(1962). He presents the idea that disputants should take “a set of trust-building steps, such as 
announcement of his or her steps ahead of time, establishment and observation of a timetable, 
advocating reciprocity and cooperation reward” (Wall, 1995, P.537). 
 
On the other side, the actions taken by disputants to manage conflict have been appeared from 
the descriptive base. Researchers point out that disputant can proceed in a trial fashion: “one 
approach is tried; the disputants then move to another approach which is effective for a while; 
lastly, they try something else” (Wall, 1995, P.537). In addition, Coser (1967) thinks that 
disputants may turn to violence to be sure they can overcome their opponents. Later, Kriesberg 
(1992) also agree with Coser’s opinion. However, he focuses on the point that disputants may 
compromise, withdraw, or convert the opponent to manage conflict. There are numerous 
literatures related to conflict management that demonstrate on one specific aspect of negotiation 
skills. But Blake (1964) and Mouton (1970) develop a “two-dimensional grid”: one concerns for 
production and the other one concerns for people. Subsequently, other scholars develop this two-
dimension as “assertiveness” versus “cooperativeness” (Thomas, 1976), “concern for one’s own 
outcomes” versus “concern for other’s outcomes” (Pruitt, 1983). 
 
As playing a game like chess, it is wise to keep in mind that strategies need to be flexible in 
order to fit the dynamics. It is hard to detect insights before negotiators involve themselves into 
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the first meeting. Therefore, negotiators have to make good preparations for the following 
negotiating phases and establish alternatives to be sure you will freely face different situations. 
 
2.2.4 Negotiation strategy in alliance 
With the development of forming alliance to expand business, some scholars have paid attention 
to applying negotiation strategies in the field of alliance. Dual concern model (Pruitt, 1983) 
suggests that negotiators should think about four alternative strategies to manage conflicts, 
namely “problem solving”, “contending”, “yielding” and “inaction” based on the concern for 
one’s own outcomes versus other’s outcomes. Specifically, “Concern about both one's own and 
other party's outcomes encourages a problem-solving strategy; concern about only one's own 
outcomes encourages contending; concern about only the other party's outcomes encourages 
yielding; concern about neither party's outcomes encourages inaction”(Pruitt,1983). Problem-
solving strategy seeks to reconcile the parties' aspiration that includes increasing available 
resources, compensation, exchanging concessions on low priority issues, minimizing the costs of 
concessions, and creating new mutually beneficial options. Therefore, the advantage of problem 
solving strategies is that both parties yield the best outcomes; Contending strategy seeks to 
persuade the other party to agree to a solution that favors one's own interests; both yielding 
strategy and inaction strategy will reduce their aspirations, but yielding strategy is an effective 
way to close negotiations when issues are unimportant and time pressures are high; inaction 
strategy is usually used to increase time pressure on the other party (Pruitt, 1983).   
 
This dual concern model has been proved to be valuable in the field of conflict management (De 
Dreu et al., 2001). However, it is seldom to find enough demonstration on negotiation in the field 
of strategic alliance from literatures. Some researchers have presented some factors that may 
affect the outcome of forming alliance on a specific perspective. For example, Leung (1996) 
suggests the important role of fairness in joint venture. And Luo (2005) presents the influence of 
justice perception in alliance. Some other studies about negotiation strategy in alliance are listed 
in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2. 5 Recent studies of negotiation strategy in alliance
6
 
Author Year Description 
Kwok Leung, Peter 
B. Smith, et al. 
1996 
“Differences in satisfaction as a function of the cultural 
origin of expatriate managers in joint venture may be 
due to differences in perceived performance-based and 
comparative distributive justice” (p.957) 
Asha Rao and 
Stuart M. Schmidt 
1998 
“We incorporate constructs from power dependence, 
transaction cost, and game theory to develop and test a 
behavioral model of the negotiating influence tactics in 
international alliance” (p.666) 
Paul Tracey and 
Gordon L. Clark 
2003 
“The nature of some aspects of firms’ alliance 
environment may be negotiated through networks of 
social interaction between agents and their counterparts 
in other relevant organizations” (p.3) 
Arino and Reuer 2004 
“Executives need to balance the costs of negotiating, 
monitoring and enforcing complex contracts against the 
threat of opportunistic behavior” (p.38) 
Luo 2005 
“My analysis suggests that perceptions of procedural 
justices shared by both parties have a positive 
relationship with alliance profitability and perceptions of 
procedural justice shared by both parties have a stronger 
positive link with profitability than do individual parties’ 
” (p.705) 
Parry et al. 2008 
“We hypothesized that integrative potential was higher 
in decisions involving R&D task conflict than in 
decisions involving marketing task conflict” (p.211-212) 
 
Although lots of researchers have admitted the importance of dual concern model, it does not 
discuss compromising as one of the most important strategies (Das & Kumar, 2011). Therefore, 
Das and Kumar (2011) suggests other similar alternative strategies, namely “problem solving”, 
                                               
6
 Based on: Das, T. K. and R. Kumar (2011) 
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“contending”, “yielding”, and “compromising”. These strategies are defined in Table 2.6. There 
are some reasons for using this model as research framework to discuss negotiation strategies in 
alliance. Firstly, the first three strategies have already proved to be valuable in previous 
literatures (De Dreu, 2001). Secondly, it is suitable for the situation of negotiation in alliance, 
where negotiators need to keep the balance between concern for one’s own outcomes and others. 
Thirdly, if negotiators are willing to compromise in negotiating alliance, it is possible to make an 
agreement at hand even it may not be a final integrative one (Das & Kumar, 2011). 
 
Table 2. 6 Dual Concern Framework
7
 
Problem 
solving 
“Problem solving strategy is associated with a concern for a member firm’s 
own outcomes and an equally salient concern for its partner’s outcomes”. 
Contending “Contending strategy implies a high concern for one’s own outcomes 
accompanied by a low concern for the partner’s outcomes”. 
Yielding “In a yielding strategy the partner firms reduce their demands or concede to 
what the opponent is expecting of them. Concern for other’s outcomes is high 
and concern for one’s own outcomes low”. 
Compromising “Compromising strategy implies a moderate amount of concern for one’s own 
outcomes as well as for the other party’s outcomes”. 
 
 
Given the importance of his dual concern framework, this framework will be followed up and its 
empirical applications in the alliance of venture capital investment will be explored.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
7
 Source: Das, T. K. and R. Kumar (2011) 
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2.3 Fairness theory 
2.3.1 The concept of fairness 
Negotiation is obviously affected by multiple factors. Traditional models of negotiation have 
focused almost exclusively on the efficiency properties of both the process and the outcomes 
(Carraro, Marchiori & Sgobbi, 2005). It can be concluded that “rational” maximizing individual 
gains was the only or the only predominant in the negotiation process (Albin, 1992). However, 
Carraro and his colleagues (2005) also pointed out that the considerations other than efficiency 
play a crucial role in selecting which agreement will be reached – if any at all – and through 
which path. Albin (1992) mentioned that the fairness plays as an influential factor in many 
aspects in the actual practice of negotiation. We believe that fairness should be one of the most 
important factors in the negotiation. But what is fairness? 
 
The research on fairness or justice was originally started from 1960s and was only regarding 
distributive fairness. Homans (1961) firstly developed the distributive fairness theory. According 
to his study, distributive fairness is described as following: everyone in an exchange relationship 
obtains profits which are proportional to the investments. Adams (1965) used a social exchange 
theory 
8
framework to further explain the distributive fairness. He utilized the equity rule to 
determine the fairness, which is to calculate the ratio of one’s contribution to one’s outcome and 
then compare the ratio with another one’s. The comparison of the two input-outcome ratios gives 
Adams' equity theory an "objective" support, but he was clear that this process was completely 
subjective (J.A. Colquitt et al, 2001). Adams (1965) believed that what people were concerned 
about was not the absolute level of outcomes per se, but whether those outcomes were fair. 
Basically, the studies conducted by Homans and Adams built the initial foundation for the justice 
theory. 
 
In 1975, Thibaut and Walker firstly introduced the procedural fairness and enriched the research 
on justice. Since then, the study on fairness was extended into two dimensions: distributive 
fairness and procedural fairness. Thibaut and Walker found that the third-party dispute resolution 
                                               
8
 Social behavior was based on exchange. (Homans, 1958) 
   Social exchange comprises actions contingent on the rewarding reactions of others, which over time provide for 
mutually and rewarding transactions and relationships. (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005) 
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procedure normally contained a process stage and a decision stage and the disputants own 
different amount of control in each stage. According to their research, disputants believe that the 
whole procedure is fair if they keep the control in the process stage. Folger and Cropanzano 
(1998) think Thibaut and Walker (1975) virtually equated the control in the process stage with 
procedural fairness. Thibaut and Walker’s research was mainly focused on legal contexts, while 
Leventhal (1980) extended the procedural fairness into non-legal contexts and broadened the 
contents of procedural fairness far beyond the process control concept. Leventhal (1980) 
proposed six criteria to determine the procedural fairness: (1) procedures should be consistent 
across people and across time, (2) self-interests should be prevented and bias should be 
suppressed, (3) information should be accurate, (4) opportunities should be left for modification 
or correction, (5) make sure that the opinions of various groups affected by the decision have 
been considered, and (6) procedures should be compatible with the personal accepted moral and 
ethical value. 
 
Bies and Moag (1986) introduced the interactional fairness and defined it as the interpersonal 
treatment people receive when procedures are implemented. However, Greenberg (1993) 
suggested that the interactional fairness should be seen as two kinds of interpersonal treatment: 
interpersonal fairness and informational fairness. According to Greenberg’s (1993) research,  
interpersonal fairness are social aspects of distributive justice and can be sought by showing 
concern for individuals regarding the distributive outcomes they received; while informational 
fairness are social determinants of procedural justice and may be sought by providing knowledge 
about procedures that demonstrate regard for people’s concerns. Colquitt (2001) further 
supported that interactional justice should be broken down into its interpersonal and 
informational justice components, as they too had differential effects. Since then, organizational 
fairness is best conceptualized as four distinct dimensions: procedural fairness, distributive 
fairness, interpersonal fairness, and informational fairness. 
 
2.3.2 Four types of fairness 
Based on previous research on fairness, Colquitt (2001) generated some items to measure these 
four types of fairness separately (see Appendix 3). All these items provide us a structural and 
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dependable framework for measuring fairness, and these variables are used as inspiration for our 
interview guide in our case study. 
 
2.3.3 The application of fairness theory 
The research on fairness initially centered on the fairness among people. Researchers started to 
integrate fairness concerns with outcomes related to organizations in 1975 (J. A. Colquitt et al, 
2001). Organizational fairness is “grown around attempts to describe and explain the role of 
fairness as a consideration in the workplace” (Greenberg, 1990). Until the late 90’s, the research 
regarding organizational fairness can be found in the most frequently topics in industrial 
organizational psychology, human resource management and organizational behavior 
(Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). Konovsky (2000) pointed out that the study of organizational 
fairness mainly focused on the micro-level such as “individual-individual” relationship and 
“individual-organization” relationship in the organization, while the research on the macro-level 
such as inter-firm relationship (“organization-organization”) remained sparse. Fairness theory 
can be potentially implemented in some macro-level research such as the manner in which 
resources are allocated within a particular firm as well as between firms (Kim & Mauborgne, 
1993). Kim and Mauborgne (1993) firstly utilized the fairness theory to study the relationship 
between the headquarters and the subsidiaries in the context of strategic management. However, 
the study based on fairness theory in inter-organization was still scarce. Luo (2005) continued 
the fairness research on the macro-level and examined the perceptions of fairness in the 
formation process of strategic alliance. It’s very important to notice that most researchers 
focused on the operations of strategic alliance by implementing the fairness theory, but Luo 
(2005) is the first researcher who conducted the study about the formation of strategic alliance by 
using fairness theory. In Luo’s (2007) research, interactional fairness was still not splitted into 
interpersonal fairness and informational fairness. Ariño and Ring (2010) used fairness theory to 
conduct another study on the alliance formation. Differing from Luo (2007), Ariño and Ring 
(2010) studied the mechanisms between two firms (organization-organization) in the formation 
phase of alliance from four-dimensions: procedural fairness, distributive fairness, interpersonal 
fairness, and informational fairness. Following Ariño and Ring’s study, our research also 
employs the four-dimension fairness theory. 
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2.3.4 The understanding of fairness in negotiation 
Fairness is actually related to negotiation. According to Albin’s (1992) study, parties in 
negotiation usually rely on fairness notions to distinguish between and evaluate alternatives for a 
solution; to coordinate expectations and forge consensus regarding an agreement; to ensure a 
stable agreement; and to foster good relations with the other side for future dealings. Albin (1992) 
admitted that fairness arguments are used as a cover only to couch the pursuit of self-interests at 
the expense of the other side in many negotiations. However, Albin (1992) also pinpointed that 
fairness notions influence the "give-and-take" in the bargaining process and help parties forge 
agreement. As he said, “concepts of fairness may create a motivation to resolve a particular 
problem through negotiation in the first place, and will have an impact on the positions and the 
expectations which parties bring to the table” (Albin, 1992). Therefore, the parties involved in 
the negotiation believe that the longer the influence of fairness lasts, the higher is the possibility 
for a fair behavior and agreement (Young, 1992).   
 
The failure of negotiations can be caused by many reasons. One reason is that the desire to 
maximize gains and minimize losses leads individuals to act in ways that prevent mutually 
beneficial agreements from occurring (Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, 2008). The preference for 
gain maximization and loss minimization is related to many cognitive biases, such as a fixed pie 
bias (Bazerman & Neale, 1983) which may make an individual assume that anything that 
benefits the other party will hurt him or her. This kind of conflict in negotiations is highly related 
to the distributive fairness. Fairness research relating to negotiated conflicts focuses mainly on 
outcome fairness, or distributive justice (Welsh, 2004). However, people care not just about 
maximizing their outcomes, or even about the distributive justice of their outcomes, but also care 
independently about the fairness of the process by which those outcomes were obtained 
(Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, 2008). Procedural justice has been found to play a large role in 
assessments of decision making (Tyler & Blader, 2005). The research conducted by Hollander-
Blumoff and Tyler (2008) suggested that using fair procedures is one way to move beyond the 
fixed-pie bias and facilitate the development of integrative bargaining. Thus, we can summarize 
that fairness play an important role in the negotiation. Carraro (2005) also suggested that it is 
very important to incorporate fairness in the bargaining theory. 
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2.3.5 Property rights and Control rights 
The study conducted by Sapienza (2000) and his colleagues suggested that the relational 
processes and procedural fairness of the parties’ behavior impact the levels of cooperation 
between venture capital firm and start-up company. Actually, the allocation of property rights 
and the control rights in strategic alliance plays an important role during the cooperation. 
According to Ariño and Ring’s (2010) research, the perception of fairness helps to shape the 
interactions between the property rights and control rights logics of parties, illustrating that the 
perception of fairness matters to the formation of alliance. 
 
Property rights, simply, is the right possessed by the owner of an asset where the owner has the 
ability to exclude others from the use of that asset (Hart & Moore, 1990). For a firm in the 
alliance, the property right is the right to decide how these assets are to be used except to the 
extent those particular usages have been specified in an initial contract (Hart & Moore, 1990). 
According to Hart and Moore’s (1990) study, control over a physical asset can lead indirectly to 
control over human assets. Elfenbein and Lerner (2003) furtherly pointed that ownership of the 
assets confers upon the owning party residual rights of control over the assets. The owner of the 
assets gains bargaining power from asset ownership that enables him to appropriate a majority of 
the surplus that results from the project. When allocated efficiently, the incentives provided by 
ownership will induce the owning party to make decisions that maximize-or come close to 
maximizing-the returns from the project (Elfenbein & Lerner, 2003). The relationship of the 
allocation regarding ownership and return is can be related to the distributive fairness. 
 
The allocation of property rights between has been studied by some scholars in different 
industrial contexts. In biotechnology industry, Aghion and Tirole (1994) suggested that property 
rights should be allocated to the R&D firm when the marginal impact of its research effort on the 
value of the final output is greater than the marginal impact of the financing partner's financial 
investment. In internet industry, (internet alliance), Elfenbein and Lerner (2003) thought the 
ownership of critical elements such as the website address and the customer data was typically 
assigned to the party whose effort was most critical to the success of the agreement. 
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Based on the research conducted by Elfenbein and Lerner (2003), the allocation of control rights 
appeared most sensitive to the bargaining power of the two contracting parties. If Aghion and 
Tirole (1994) is followed, the control right can be thought as the relative financial and product-
market strength of the two parties. As mentioned above, the party owns huge ownership with its 
accompanying residual rights of control normally can maximize the gains. However, including 
some specified control rights in the contract to restrict the control rights granted to the asset 
owner is still possible (Elfenbein & Lerner, 2003). The specified control rights here can be 
deemed as the Control rights. In fact, the specified control rights can be different types and are 
widely utilized in practice. Specified control rights serve a role similar to ownership in the 
property-right as approach in creating incentives. Empirical analyses of contracting should, 
therefore, analyze the allocation of specified control rights in addition to ownership (Elfenbein & 
Lerner, 2003). According to Elfenbein and Lerner’s study, It is very important to notice that the 
control rights are sensitive to relative bargaining power, but ownership is not. 
 
The allocation of the control rights is also considerable important. Lerner and Merges (1998) 
suggested that the allocation of control rights is a central issue in the negotiation of alliances.  In 
the alliance’s proposed governance structure, parties pay attention to both the fairness of the 
allocation of control rights and the process they negotiate (Ariño & Ring, 2010). This suggests 
that the procedural fairness relates to the control rights logic. In strategic alliance, venture 
capitalists often hold extensive control rights over start-up companies,including the right to fire 
entrepreneurs (Hellmann, 1998). According to hellmann’s (1998) research, control rights matter 
either because they allow one party to make a decision in the presence of conflict of interest or 
because they affect the threat points in any renegotiation. 
 
In summary, numerous scholars have conducted research on strategic alliances during the past 
two decades. Some researchers studied the strategic alliances based on the fairness theory. Ariño 
and Ring (2010) used the fairness theory to research the mechanism between two companies in 
the formation phase of an international alliance from four-dimension: procedural fairness, 
distributive fairness, interpersonal fairness, and informational fairness.Others may have only 
utilized the negotiation theory to explain the process of alliance formation. For example, Pruitt 
(1983) suggested the Dual Concern Model that negotiators should think about four alternative 
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strategies to manage conflicts, namely “problem solving”, “contending”, “yielding” and 
“inaction”. Later, Das and Kumar (2011) suggested another alternative strategy of 
“compromising” instead of “inaction”, which is more suitable for the situation of negotiation in 
strategic alliances. Instead of relying on either fairness theory or negotiation theory, both of these 
two theories are chosen to analyze strategic alliances in the formation phase. Considering the 
contribution of previous literatures, two main articles from Das and Kumar (2011) and Ariño 
(2010) are followed to further understand the connection between fairness perception and 
negotiation strategy implementation in our empirical study.  
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Research design 
In order to provide us with a detailed plan which can guide us through the whole research 
process and to achieve our research objectives, our research design was chosen in the basis of 
our research question and accessible resources. There were four stages (see Figure 3.1) in our 
research, where each stage helped us to set up our milestones.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.1 Research question 
On the basis of previous literatures, it is considered that negotiation strategy plays a crucial role 
in the formation of strategic alliances and influences the success of the formation. It is important 
to notice that the negotiation strategy itself is impacted by many different factors. However, 
current studies of empirical assessment on the effects of different negotiation strategies in the 
phase of alliances formation remain sparse. Furthermore, few researchers utilize the fairness 
theory to analyze the insights of strategic alliances between venture capital firms and start-up 
companies. All these limitations encourage us to pose our research question as following: How 
do perceptions of fairness affect negotiation outcomes during strategic alliance formation 
between VC firms and start-up companies?  
Literature 
review 
Initial 
propositions 
Testing 
interview guide 
Testing interview 
with VCs 
Refined 
interview guide 
Interview with 
VCs 
Data 
analysis  
Research 
question 
Results 
Refined 
propositions 
Stage 1 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 2 
Figure 3. 1 Research procedures 
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3.1.2 Case study 
Considering the definition of case study - a case study is normally chosen when the research 
question is “how” or “why”, there is limited control over the events being studied, and those 
events are contemporary and in a real life context (Yin, 2009). Since our research question is 
based on the perspective of how fairness perception affects alliance formation in the 
contemporary society, case study is chosen for our research design to investigate real-life events. 
 
Although some researchers have found the importance of fairness in alliance formations, few 
found the interactions between fairness and negotiation outcomes of alliance formations. For this 
reason, this research will try to explain how fairness perceptions will affect negotiation outcomes 
by using explanatory case studies. 
 
Yin (2003) pointed out that although many kinds of design might lead to successful case studies, 
but if options are available, multiple-case designs might be preferred over single-case designs on 
complex subjects. The more cases that can be marshaled to develop a theory, the more robust are 
the research outcomes (Wilson, 2010). Since it is needed to analyze many cases (initially 10 
cases) to support our research, it is well suited for multiple-case case study. 
 
Our choice of case study was designed to allow us to realize what the complete process of 
negotiation is between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in the formation phase. The case 
study also contributed to investigate how venture capitalists, our interviewees, deal with the 
process of negotiation with entrepreneurs, which helps us to analyze why some factors during the 
negotiation will affect the final outcome.   
 
Besides choosing case study, in terms of time horizon, cross-sectional design is suitable for our 
research due to the condition of a very short period of investigating and limited budgets.  
 
3.1.3 The choice of case 
The cases studied were all short-term (approximately 5 years) cooperation between venture 
capital firms and start-up companies in the early stage in IT industry. In addition, only VC firms 
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located in Oslo were chosen, which helped us to conduct face-to-face interviews. Considering 
the time limitation, this study would only investigate successful deals, where the VC decided to 
invest. 
3.1.4 The unit of analysis 
As one of the major entities of analysis in studies (Wilson, 2010), the unit of analysis in our 
research is one specific investment case in early stage in IT industry. The participants in our 
interviews are experienced VCs from different VC firms (one venture capitalist per VC firm) 
who have many years of work experience in this field. The venture capitalist from each firm 
presented one specific case he/she had experienced. The answers to the interview questions were 
also based on the specific case. Much valuable information was gained by talking with VCs and 
used to analyze how fairness influences strategic alliance formation from the VCs’ perspective. 
3.1.5 The quality of research  
Given that it was very difficult to attain access to ongoing negotiations between venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs, the longitudinal design could not be used in this research. Because 
these cases were not ongoing and some of them occurred several years ago, the interviewees 
might have forgotten some details. Also, the interviewees were not willing to share the related 
documents (term sheet and shareholder agreement). Thus, the data was mainly obtained through 
the communications with the interviewees. This is the main threat to the reliability of this 
research. However, some principles suggested by Yin (2003) were followed for improving the 
research reliability. 
 
 Use multiple sources of evidence 
The multiple-case design was used in our case study. It was conducted a total of seven case 
studies by interviewing seven VCs from different VC firms.  The information obtained from 
these seven different sources supplied us data for the following discussions and conclusion. As 
Wilson (2010) mentioned, “any finding or conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more 
convincing and accurate if it is based on several different sources of information”. Thus, the 
multiple-case design can ensure the reliability of our case study to a certain extent. 
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 Create a case study database 
The case study data in this thesis includes interview notes, voice recordings and emails of follow 
up questions. Interview notes were organized immediately after every interview and voice 
recordings were also transcribed. Then, the structural notes and transcriptions were categorized 
into the different type of fairness and negotiation strategies. The follow up questions would be 
sent to the interviewees if any necessary information were missing. The interviewees’ replies 
were also organized and put in the category it belonged to. Then, all these categorized data were 
further coded. Finally, the case study database was created and ready to be used for our 
following analysis. 
 
In this research, seven cases were illustrated and analyzed for explaining the influences of 
fairness in the negotiation in the context of the particular research setting. Some new insights 
were provided in the study but the findings might not be generalized to other settings. Some 
methods were used for improving the research validity in this thesis. 
 
 Internal validity (content) 
In order to improve content validity, both face and sampling validity were used in this research. 
For the face validity, the interview guide was sent to the supervisor for review. For the sampling 
validity, the perceptions of fairness were studied from four aspects: procedural fairness, 
distributive fairness, interpersonal fairness, and informational fairness. But to examine the entire 
subject of strategic alliances, the negotiation process was also measured.  
 
 Internal validity (construct) 
The research question and objectives were changed continuously before the process of literature 
review. We presented our research question and objectives to our supervisors several times. They 
helped us to ensure our research question and objectives were comprehensible. According to 
their suggestions, the research question and objectives were further improved. After several 
months of discussions, the research question and objectives had become more clear and workable. 
The interview guide was firstly sent to the supervisors and they provided some suggestions for 
modifications from an academic aspect. Then, the first two interviews were conducted and used 
as “pilot” interviews. The questions used in the interview were modified and improved according 
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to the interviewees’ reactions and suggestions. For example, before the interview started, the 
interview guide was sent to the interviewee for review. During the interview, the interviewee’s 
reactions to each question were noted. After the interview, the interviewee was requested to offer 
feedbacks on the interview questions, which were used to improve the interview guide. 
 
Note taking and voice recording were the data collection methods in our case study. Note taking 
was used in the interview for recording the key points, including the conversation contents, 
interviewee’s attitudes and feelings. Voice recording was used to preserve the conversation 
contents and maintain a high accuracy when transcribing the data. Follow up questions were also 
used for acquiring more information after the interviews. 
 
3.2 Research methods 
3.2.1 Research setting 
In order to understand how fairness is perceived between VCs and entrepreneurs, a multiple case 
study research (Yin, 2003) was conducted.  To be able to understand the literature and theories 
used in this thesis, data to support the literature was needed. As there is no definite answer to 
how many cases there should be included in a multiple study, however, Rowley (2002) suggests 
that six to twelve cases might be sufficient to achieve literal replication. Fifteen venture capital 
firms were contacted to ask if they were willing to participate in our research. Our industry of 
interest was within IT. Six face-to-face interviews and one telephone interview were conducted. 
Given the short time period of our research, it had only been feasible to follow up the companies 
by emails if further questions arise. The VC firms chosen were all situated in Oslo, except one 
firm which is based in Kristiansand. The reason for contacting this firm was because one of us 
knew about him from before in a work related matter. In this thesis it is chosen to investigate 
only successful deals, where the VC decided to invest in the start-up company. 
 
In an ideal setting, a longitudinal study would have been preferred over cross-sectional study 
where the whole negotiations process could be followed over time, from the very first meeting 
between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur until the signing of the deal. The data 
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collected would be more robust and correct if it was possible to observe both sides during the 
negotiation. Currently, hearing only one side of the story can leave room for error. But, again, 
the negotiators present at the meetings may not like outsiders participating and getting insight in 
every aspect of their negotiation. 
 
Like many case studies, the names of the firms and interviewees in our study are disguised to 
preserve confidentiality. The cases that were studied were short-term investment at the early 
stage in IT industry. All the VC firms were firstly screened and then the firms whose portfolio 
can meet our requirements were selected. The overview of each case has been summarized in 
Appendix 5. A brief introduction of these firms is illustrated below: 
 
VC firm 1 was founded in 2001 and have two funds under management. They invest in privately 
held, early stage technology companies. They have currently 16 active investments in their 
portfolio and have exited 6 companies. The company is made up of four partners. Our 
interviewee holds the position as partner. 
 
VC firm 2 was established in 2001 and manages two funds. They invest within a broad range of 
technology sectors. Primarily, they invest in early stage companies. Currently, they have 9 active 
investments and exited 9 companies. The teams consist of three partners. Our interviewee holds 
the position as partner. 
 
VC firm 3 was founded in 2006 and is a seed venture fund where they invests in technology 
start-up companies. They have 10 active investments in their portfolio. The team consists of four 
employers where our interviewee holds the position as partner. 
 
VC firm 4 was established in 1996 and invests in early stage technology companies.  They have 
31 active investments and exited 26 companies.  The team is composed of 10 employers where 
our interviewee holds the position as general partner. 
 
VC firm 5 was founded in 1889 where they started out within a very different industry before 
they changed into a venture capital firm in the late 90’s. The team consists of 13 employers 
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where our interviewee holds the position as investment manager. They have 13 active 
investments in their portfolio. They have exited four companies.  They invest in technology and 
oil/offshore companies. 
 
VC firm 6 was founded in 1985 and have four funds under management. The majority of 
investments are in growth stage, but they also invest in early stages within technology, energy, 
and advanced industry. The company has 11 employers where our interviewee holds the position 
as partner. 
 
VC firm 7 was established in 2006 and manages three funds. They invest in seed and early stage 
companies with focus on technology, energy, and offshore industry. They have currently 11 
active investments in their portfolio. The team consists of 8 employers where our interviewee 
holds the position as partner. 
 
3.2.2 Data collection 
The goal of our case study was to understand how the four types of fairness influence the 
negotiation outcomes in the formation phase of successful strategic alliances from a venture 
capitalist’s perspective. Thus, the negotiation processes between VC firms and start-up 
companies were invaluable for our research. However, accessing the ongoing strategic 
negotiation is almost impossible for our study. The main reason was that both VC firms and 
start-up companies normally would not like to involve non-relative parties in their negotiations 
for confidential reasons. Though the fact of ongoing negotiations between the VCs and the 
entrepreneurs cannot be acquired by us, the historical negotiations between them are also 
valuable for our study. Interviewing VCs was the best method that could be used to obtain these 
information. According to Crang and Cook’s (2007) study, interviewing is a primary method 
through which ethnographic researchers can get to grips with the contexts of different people's 
everyday social, cultural, political and economic lives. Simply, “it’s a method of gleaning 
information from conversations within various research communities” (Crang & Cook, 2007). 
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In this research, it was considered that the semi-structured
9
 interview was the most suitable. On 
one hand, we did not want to limit ourselves or the interview by formalizing the interview too 
much, because it might be possible for us to get new ideas through the interviews. On the other 
hand, an interview guide is essential since it can help us center on important topics in the limited 
time perspective. To summarize, by performing semi-structured interview, a framework for what 
needs to be explored will be established, but this research was open to “a change of direction” 
and flexible in order to come up with new questions as new information occurs. 
 
A testing question guide was generated (see our question guide in Appendix 4) as the framework 
for guiding the interviews. These questions were open-ended questions which can provide the 
interviewees a relative freedom to express their real thoughts. For the convenience of organizing 
and analyzing interview data, our question guide was designed in correspondence with the 
fairness and the negotiation strategy. But it was not known if these questions would work well in 
the practical interview, so the testing interviews were necessary. The question guide was sent in 
advance to our supervisors for adjusting and improving our interview questions. Therefore, the 
first two interviews were conducted as trials. Fortunately, good feedbacks and useful suggestions 
were received from the first two interviewees who helped us to improve our interview questions. 
Therefore, the quality of the following interviews can be ensured to a certain extent.     
 
Given the short time limitation, it was chosen to angle the cases from only one perspective, 
respectively, from the VCs point of view. To our advantage, the NVCA (Norwegian Venture 
Capital Association) website already had an extensive VC firm list available online, therefore the 
search for VC firms were not as difficult as it was anticipated. Fortunately, several of the VC 
firms listed on the web page were related to our choice of industry (IT). The rest of the VC firms 
were obtained by our network and by searching online. The VC firms were contacted and 
interview request letters were sent electronically to the venture capitalists. Usually, a reply letter 
would be received around two days after sending out our request letter telling if they would like 
to accept the interview. For those who didn’t reply, a reminder would be sent or phone calls 
would be made to them directly to check again if they were willing to participate in the interview. 
In total, interview request letters were sent out to 15 venture VC firms, and finally 7 interviews 
                                               
9
 The researcher and participant[s] set some broad parameters to a discussion. (Crang & Cook, 2007) 
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were obtained. In our request letter, a 45-minute face-to-face interview was requested. In fact, 
the length of our interviews would range from 30 minutes to 1 hour and 15 minutes. Crang and 
Cook (2007) pointed out that one hour is long enough, for a single interview to collect sufficient 
data and to enable the discussion of a range of issues, while being short enough to be “user 
friendly” for most interviewees. Before starting each interview, the question guide was sent 
beforehand to the interviewee for review and preparation. The locations of our interviews were 
mostly at the interviewees’ office for their convenience. It was considered that by conducting the 
interview in the favor of the interviewee with regard to the place, he or she can keep natural and 
express the opinions and ideas freely. 
 
The interview mainly concentrated on the negotiation process of one specific successful 
investment case that the interviewee had done before, but the general personal experience of the 
interviewee was also welcomed.   
 
During our interviews, voice recording and notes were taken to document the interview data. 
Taking notes is one of the most important data collection methods and usually used in interviews. 
According to Clifford’s (1990) study, the notes are taken when engaging in direct conversations 
about a topic (interview) and write answers down verbatim away from ongoing activities. 
Besides the note taking, voice recording was another crucial data collection method in our 
interviews. As Crang and Cook (2007) said, “voice recording is important because: constantly 
scribbling down phrases and other notes can be very distracting both for the interviewer and 
interviewee and may disrupt what could otherwise proceed as a fairly normal conversation; 
second, the researcher's memory is unlikely to be good enough to remember the intricacies of not 
only what was said but how it was said and, third, many researchers find it mentally exhausting 
to listen very closely to everything that their/our interviewees say”. In addition, all of us took 
part in every interview because this is helpful for avoiding the interviewers’ personal bias. 
During the interview, when one of us talked with the interviewee, the other two focused on 
taking notes for minimizing the loss of important information. 
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3.3 Data analysis and coding procedures 
As Silverman and Marvasti (2008) mentioned, “voice recorded interviews, like texts and audios 
of naturally occurring interaction, allow you to return to your data in its original form as often 
as you wish”. Fortunately, voice recordings were made on several interviews. Thus, our case 
study raw data consisted of interview notes, voice recordings and emails of follow up questions. 
All the raw data had to be transcribed before analyzing. Given that the questions in our interview 
guide were designed based on the fairness and negotiation strategy, the interview notes was easy 
organize and classify by the types of fairness and negotiation strategies. “As with the writing of 
field notes, the preparation of a transcript from an audio or videotape is a theoretical saturated 
activity” (Silverman & Marvasti, 2008). However, transcribing the voice recordings was time 
consuming. First the voice recordings were listened and those parts of that were relevant to the 
fairness and negotiation strategy were selected. Then these selected parts were transcribed and 
transcriptions were organized by the types of fairness and negotiation strategies. Some parts of 
the recordings that were irrelevant to the fairness and negotiation strategy were also transcribed. 
Those data helped us to discover new findings. Beside the interview notes and voice recordings, 
emails of follow up questions were also important for us since they supplemented additional 
crucial information that was not obtained from our interviews. All these replies were also 
organized and added into our database. It’s important to notice that all the data generated from 
our case studies are of high confidentiality. 
 
After the process of transcribing the written notes and audio recordings, collected data were 
organized into different categories related to fairness and negotiation strategy and coded into 
keywords which were referred as “coded concepts”. Our data analysis of fairness was performed 
by following the similar coding procedures used by Colquitt (2001) and Ariño and Ring (2010). 
And data analysis of negotiation strategy was performed under the definition from Das and 
Kumar’s (2011) research. As transcribed records make it hard to see patterns and create relations, 
“coding fractures the data and rearranges it into categories that facilitate the comparison of 
data within and between these categories and that aid in the development of theoretical 
concepts” (Strauss, 1987). Both the emergent and priori coding approach (Wilson, 2010) were 
adopted. Some of the categories were created during the coding and some were created 
beforehand, based from theories. The combination of these two techniques allows us to “look for 
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specific set of codes while at the same time provides the flexibility to note any emergent or 
unforeseen codes” (Wilson, 2010).  Therefore, the method of open coding (creating own labels) 
(Wilson, 2010) was used. 
 
Our transcribed interview data were firstly coded to identify fairness (see detailed procedures in 
Colquitt’s study (2001) and Ariño’s study (2010)) and negotiation strategy related expressions. 
Other valuable information in our transcribed data, such as property rights and controls rights 
related expressions are coded using definition from previous articles; rationality, transparency 
and BATNA related expressions are new concepts coded by summarizing from our findings. 
 
According to Das and Kumar’ dual concern model (see Chapter 2 of literature review), the basis 
of concern for one’s own outcomes versus other’s outcomes. Specifically, “concern about both 
one's own and other party's outcomes encourages a problem-solving strategy; concern about 
only one's own outcomes encourages contending; concern about only the other party's outcomes 
encourages yielding” (Pruitt,1983); and “a moderate amount of concern for one’s own outcomes 
as well as for the other party’s outcomes encourages compromising strategy”( Das & Kumar, 
2011). From the first two test interviews, it was difficult for the VCs to elaborate on their 
negotiation strategies because they did not use any specific “concept” to define their way of 
negotiation. As one of our interviewees said:  
 
“It is hard to define what kind of [negotiation] strategies I have been using [...] Well, it 
might be very easy for you students to find a name in your books, but it is difficult to 
formulate them [negotiation strategies] in the business world ” 
Venture capitalist, Case A 
 
Therefore, it was decided to add an additional question in the last section (see Appendix 4) of 
our interview guide. In this question, all the four negotiation strategies under academic 
definition were listed, where they could only choose one alternative which best describes their 
negotiation approach. From the initial definition, it was difficult for us to understand the 
difference between problem-solving strategy and compromising strategy, which need to be 
discussed further. 
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Compromising strategy desires fair balance where both sides appear to get an equitable deal 
(Pruitt, 1991). Das and Kumar (2011) applied this strategy into firms that are moderately 
cooperative, flexible, and short-term oriented will pursue this strategy. People using this 
strategy are seeking to: optimize their solutions of short-term cooperation, and it is not so 
significant to have the very best outcomes. On the other hand, Problem-solving strategy is 
defined as increasing available resources, compensation, exchanging concessions on low 
priority issues, minimizing the costs of concessions, and creating new mutually beneficial 
options (Pruitt, 1991). The feature of problem-solving strategy is: yielding the very best 
beneficial outcomes and hardly relinquishing their own needs. By comparing the feature of both 
two strategies, it is considered that if negotiators chose compromising strategy, they would 
realize the fact that no one would get everything they want, so negotiators would like to find an 
equitable arrangement by using alternatives. By contrast, if they chose problem-solving strategy, 
the negotiators would pursue a suitable way to understand the other side’s situation, where they 
can find a solution that will meet both sides’ needs to a great extent without giving up too much 
about their own needs. 
 
As mentioned earlier (see Chapter 2 of Literature review), property right is the right to decide 
how assets are to be used except to the extent that particular usages have been specified in an 
initial contract (Hart & Moore, 1990).  The ownership of the assets confers upon the owning 
party residual rights of control over the assets (Elfenbein & Lerner, 2003). Based on the 
definition of previous research, the amount of investment and the shares of ownership are used to 
measure the allocation of property rights in the strategic alliance formation. According to 
Elfenbein and Lerner (2003), it is possible to include some specified control rights in the 
contract to restrict the control rights granted to the asset owner. The specified control rights here 
can be thought as the control rights. In strategic alliances, it is perceived that the control of board 
of directors, the right to change the management team and the right of decision-making can be 
used to measure the allocation of control rights.   
 
Given that a suitable description of rationality in previous articles is not found, in this thesis, it is 
coded as the degree of collecting relevant information comprehensively, thinking consistent to 
forecasts what might happen in the near future, making the decision that maximizes both parties’ 
40 
 
interests, and acting decently that helps to well understand each other. In addition, we try to keep 
this definition of rationality in our mind, make our conversations very open and summarize our 
interviewees’ opinions when they talk about the negotiation process. Generally, we can only 
determine rationality through either the emphasizing or ordinary tone used and based on context. 
The context could be in information collection, disaster forecast, or mutual understanding. 
Measurements of rationality with questions such as “to what degree did you collect relevant 
information?” and “to what degree did you think potential possibilities of conflicts or 
disagreements?” are adopted. 
 
Transparency is the quality of being easy to understand or know about relevant information 
(Longman, 2009). Ball (2009) found that the definition of transparency reveals three metaphors: 
  
A. Transparency as a public value embraced by society to counter corruption 
B. Transparency synonymous with open decision-making by governments and nonprofits,  
C. Transparency as a complex tool of good governance in programs, policies, organizations, 
and nations.  
 
Lamming and his colleagues (2001) believed that transparency may be one of several elements 
that are built into the specific relationship, along with others such as agreed procedures, equity 
sharing, joint patents, long-term acquaintance. They also pointed out that wider information 
sharing can create transparency (Lamming et al., 2001). It is proposed that the effective 
communication and sensitive information sharing between participants in negotiations can be 
thought as transparency. Our measurements of transparency have adopted questions such as: do 
the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur exchange information quickly? 
 
BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement) was introduced by Fisher and Ury (1981) 
as a tool for negotiators to resolve power imbalances.  They did not define what BATNA is, but 
described it as a concept that can help negotiators understand their alternatives in a dispute and 
help reach agreements that satisfy their interests (Fisher & Ury, 1981). An alternative solution 
could be, for example, resolving a conflict outside of the process of negotiation and instead in a 
court procedure (Fisher & Ury, 1981). When negotiators has the option of “choosing” between 
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two offers (original and alternative offer), the offers can be compared with each other and the 
negotiators can determine which of them should be considered for acceptance, or if both should 
be rejected. This alternative solution gives both sides of the negotiation the chance to see things 
from another perspective and influence them to make better judgments. Also, the negotiators 
may be more positive to try to negotiate a solution that serves their interests (Fisher & Ury, 
1981). The implementation of a BATNA is measured by considering the degree of conflicts and 
disagreements and what kind of solutions was being employed to solve these conflicts and 
disagreements. 
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4. Case presentations 
Before making a further understanding of our research question: How do perceptions of fairness 
affect negotiation outcomes during strategic alliance formation between VC firms and start-up 
companies? First the whole process of negotiation between venture capital firms and start-up 
companies is looked into. From our first two interviews data, the ground for the negotiation 
process is established. Even though this has been looked into in the literature review, it is better 
to further see how this was done in Norway and if there were any differences. Therefore, the 
VCs are asked to lay out their negotiation stages (see Figure 4.1). This is a combined process of 
the first to VC firms and a short description of each stage is provided: 
 
Figure 4. 1 Negotiation stages 
                            
 
These stages are almost identical to the investment decision making process, except that most of 
the VCs (4 out of 7) interviewed said that they performed the term sheet before the due diligence. 
 
During the first stage, the VCs look for new deals in several ways: incoming deals by email, 
referrals from other VCs or network, or conferences or forum. Normally, nothing is done at this 
stage except for small talk with the entrepreneur and reading the presentation of the idea. If the 
VCs is attracted by the case, they will go to the next level, screening. Here, the VCs go through 
documentations, check the company, and evaluate the technology (often done by external 
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consultants/advisors). If everything looks good here, then the VCs will present the case to the 
rest of the team and if everyone approves, then the VCs will go to the next step, term sheet. The 
most “heavy” negotiation is done here. As understood, this stage takes up to approximately 40-
50% of the whole negotiation process. If the terms and conditions are accepted by the VCs and 
the entrepreneur then the VCs will perform the due diligence. It is necessary to know why some 
firms performed the due diligence after the term sheet and the explanation was that if the  
 idea/product is very good or/and the start-up company already have an investor then VCs will 
present the term sheet first to “lock” the start-up company from accepting other offers. But, there 
have been situations where this has proved to be not effective. Several VCs, that performed the 
term sheet before the due diligence, have confided in us that they actually came across several 
critical issues during the due diligence even though the pre-evaluation of the idea/product did not 
show any problems. The aftermath has two out springs: some VCs decide not to use any more 
time or money on the case and backs off, others chose to perform a new evaluation and. Those 
that choose to perform a new evaluation on the start-up company also re-negotiate the term sheet. 
The last stage is the deal closing, where VCs have the make the decision of investment. Up to 
this stage, the VCs can back out whenever they like. Nothing is 100% decided or signed. 
 
Since the negotiation processes for both VC firms were very much alike, it was decided not to 
spend more time on this topic with the other five VC firms during the interviews. Also, this 
process will not be discussed any further in the case presentations. Given that the main focus is 
on one specific negotiation case in each VC firm interviewed, in the sections that follows, this 
thesis will elaborate on each case and present the data by focusing on fairness, negotiation 
strategy and other coded concepts. 
 
4.1 Case A 
Case A is the first company interviewed that provided considerably amount of valuable 
information on the negotiation process between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. After 
transcribing the interview data from voice recordings and notes, all these data and coded key 
concepts are categorized, which will help us to further develop our new theory. The 
characteristics of the firm are described as following: 
44 
 
Table 4. 1 Characteristics of Case A 
Fairness Category Example 
Distributive fairness No big difference between the initial goal and final 
outcome 
 
Procedural fairness Presented what the whole process would be to the 
entrepreneur 
 
Interpersonal fairness Created trust with the entrepreneur and earned respect 
from him 
 
Informational fairness Used all kinds of communications openly and everything 
needed to be confirmed by documentation 
Negotiation Strategy  
Problem solving 
strategy 
High concern for both interests 
Coded Concepts  
Property rights Invested 1 million USD and received 25%-30% shares of 
ownership 
 
Control rights Did not change the top management team 
 
Rationality Prepared well for all the necessary documents;  
Understood the situation and be reasonable during 
negotiations 
 
Based on one specific case that the venture capitalist has invested in the field of IT industry, 
interviews are started by focusing on the whole negotiation process in steps. In the beginning, the 
venture capitalist and the entrepreneur found each other at a conference where the company held 
a short presentation about their business idea. During the following four months, one partner was 
responsible for this case and the negotiation with the entrepreneur. 
 
Considering the topic of fairness, it was not asked directly since the concept is difficult to define 
and explain to the venture capitalist as the interpretation may vary from person to person. Instead, 
fairness was broken down into four different types, namely distributive, procedural, 
interpersonal, and informational fairness and our measurements of fairness are based on 
previous framework (see Chapter 2 in Literature review). By analyzing the interview data, it was 
found that the venture capitalist had touched on all these four types of fairness during the 
negotiation process, for example, the venture capitalist said that both parties ended up with their 
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desired amount of shares of ownership at the end of the final investment agreement, which is 
defined as distributive fairness; “everything should be written down about the whole ‘scenario’ 
(possibilities) and explained to the entrepreneur to make the whole process more reasonable” 
(Venture capitalist, Case A), which is defined as procedural fairness; by highly emphasizing the 
importance of respect, trust, and interpersonal relationship the interpersonal fairness is defined; 
the venture capitalist chose a remarkably open style to communicate with entrepreneur, which is 
termed as informational fairness. 
 
It is noticed that, it is hard to let the venture capitalist talk about what kind of strategy or 
formulation he used during the negotiation process. Instead, he answered several open-ended 
questions related to negotiating skills and factors that were significant to a successful outcome 
from his standpoint. He shared his experience of openness in the first meeting with the 
entrepreneur, which he described as “do nothing (research about the company, the person, and 
the product) before the first formal meeting with the entrepreneur”. It is considered that this is 
one of the best ways to decrease personal biases in the beginning. Moreover, once disagreements 
or conflicts emerge during the negotiation process, the only effective solution is being 
reasonable, which is to understand the situation and find reasons behind the phenomenon. It is 
very important to notice that both sides should be rational, including thinking and acting. 
Sometimes, entrepreneurs are seemingly emotional about their products, and they do not really 
understand what the market is and how much risk the venture capitalist has to undertake. 
According to interviews’ expressions, rationality is coded as by thinking consistent and forecast 
what might happen in the near future, making the decisions that maximizes both parties’ 
interests, and acting decently as to help to understand each other well. By emphasizing 
rationality during the negotiation process, it will improve the possibility of maximizing 
negotiators’ interests and minimizing conflicts or disagreements. A situation where the VCs 
describe rationality can be easily found. The venture capitalist comments: 
 
“They [entrepreneurs] are quite emotional when it comes to their ‘babies’, their ideas, 
their products or services […], so you have to get it down into something that you can 
almost create into pages. Then you need to explain to them what the product is, who your 
potential customers are, or other possibilities […], and make them understand what we 
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are going to do. We are trying to keep everything rational, not irrational, and we [VCs] 
try not to get ourselves emotional firstly […], we try to bring them (disagreements) down 
to something that can be manageable and discussed. If all of us [entrepreneur and VCs] 
become emotional or irrational, then we [VCs] walk away because we don’t want to 
work with people who are emotional or irrational” 
Venture capitalist, Case A 
 
In our research, the shares of ownership are used to evaluate property rights, and the venture 
capitalist's decision of changing the management team in the start-up company as determining 
the venture capitalist’s control rights. It is found that the allocation of both property rights and 
control rights are important issues in the negotiation process. 
 
Considering the issue of organizational conflicts about making the decision of whether to invest 
in the company or not, an answer as following is obtained:   
 
“We don’t do the investments unless the whole partnership agrees, so there is not like, 
‘three against one’, then, that’s no [deal]. So, unless we can agree all the four of us, all 
the four partners. Then, that will be end” 
Venture capitalist, Case A 
 
This is a four – partner investment team, the deal will be invested if and only if all the four 
members consent to the investment. The principle of this decision-making “strategy” in the VC 
firm will highly improve the efficiency of negotiation and avoid the internal organizational 
conflicts. 
 
In addition, the venture capitalist was asked to share one unsuccessful case of his previous 
investment experience that the start-up company did not access to investment after whole 
negotiation process. One of the most critical reasons is different views on the valuation of the 
start-up company, which make it hard to create a mutual understanding between both sides. 
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According to the venture capitalist’s choice of problem-solving negotiation strategy under the 
academic definition as well as the interview data analysis, it is believed that the venture capitalist 
has a very high concern for both parties’ benefit. In addition, he presented his viewpoint of key 
factor that affect alliance formation in this case with a great emphasis on the importance of 
rationality. All these opinions and experience help us to well understand the real-world 
negotiation process between the VC firm and the start-up company. 
 
4.2 Case B 
The characteristics of case B are summarized in the following table: 
Table 4. 2 Characteristics of Case B 
 
In this case, the venture capitalist firstly outlined the general process of the VC firm. They go 
through around 200 cases every year and 85% of the cases are submitted by entrepreneurs. 
Among the 200 cases, about 150 cases are screened but only 15 cases are selected out to perform 
due diligence. Finally, one or two cases will be invested. The case in question is a start-up 
Fairness Category Example 
Distributive fairness Fair chance on a high return for both sides  
 
Procedural fairness If both parties would like to keep on processing after 3-4 
meetings, the following processes would be described. 
 
Interpersonal fairness Trust and respect were very important. 
 
Informational fairness Very close communication, high degree of interaction 
Negotiation Strategy  
Compromising 
Strategy 
Moderate concern for both parties 
Coded Concepts  
Property rights Not driven by the ownership 
 
Control rights Options, board control and anti-dilution are crucial 
 
Rationality Both parties should be rational in the negotiation 
 
Transparency The worst are lies 
 
BATNA Established a BATNA. Good deal flow is important 
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company, where the entrepreneur knew the venture capitalist from 15 years ago in a business 
related environment. As the venture capitalist said, this was a part of the reason why the case 
attracted his attention. After the standard screening and due diligence, they entered the term sheet 
negotiation. 
 
In the negotiation process, the allocation of property rights and control rights is always one of the 
most important issues. The interviewee thought the ownership was important but not the most 
important for him. 
 
“We are not sort of thinking in terms of ownership percentages. There are a lot of parameters 
such as pricing [of the start-up company], options and board control and so on. And we have to 
make sure that we believe we can obtain five times return [high return] in several years” 
Venture capitalist, Case B 
 
He also mentioned that they indeed had a goal of the ownership and “it did not move so much”. 
Given that there were so many parameters, they could compromise in some aspects: “one up, one 
down, try to make both parties feel fair”. The future negotiation processes were described after 
understanding the start-up company’s business and growth potential. 
 
“When both parties want to proceed we typically outline how this process is structured from our 
side” 
Venture capitalist, Case B 
 
It can be concluded that the VC's perception of fairness included both distributive and procedural 
fairness and influenced the negotiations; he thought about and acted on the principle of fair 
allocation of both property and control rights 
 
Regarding the interpersonal fairness, the venture capitalist pointed out that the trust and respect 
is very important. He thought this generally was the foundation of the negotiation. In the case, he 
knew one of the founders before and they trusted each other to a certain extent. Besides that, the 
the venture capitalist mentioned that he felt the chemistry between two were quite good. The 
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early-established personal relationship between the venture capitalist and one of the founders 
may have contributed to the good start.  
 
The good personal relationship between the venture capitalist and the founder may helped them 
to communicate more efficiently and share more information. The possibility of exchanging 
important information was also higher because of their mutual understanding. According to our 
coded concepts, effective communication and sensitive information sharing between participants 
in negotiations can be thought as transparency. In other words, the venture capitalist in this case 
might perceive more informational fairness.  
 
Another important factor mentioned in this case by the venture capitalist was the BATNA (Best 
Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement). As Fisher and Ury (1981) described, it can help 
negotiators understand their alternatives in a dispute and help reach agreements that satisfy their 
interests. In this case, the venture capitalist thought the BATNA was useful. In his opinion, 
having a BATNA gives the VC firms the benefit to have more options. Because of BATNAs, 
VCs can have more negotiation space and also increase the possibility of reaching agreement. 
 
At the end of the interview, the venture capitalist was required to select a negotiation strategy to 
best describe the negotiation process in the case. And the compromising strategy was selected by 
the interviewee. In the case, the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur listed their concerns about 
the alliance formation and discussed these concerns together. This process helped them to 
understand what were more important for the other side. They all gave up some interests and 
rights in order to achieve the successful formation of alliance. As Pruitt (1991) defined, the 
compromising strategy “desires fair balance where both sides appear to get an equitable deal”.  
 
Regarding the unsuccessful case, the worst scenario for the venture capitalist is entrepreneurs 
hiding unfavorable information which is considered as lies. In the failed case the venture 
capitalist experienced, the negotiation process was smooth at the early stage. But after several 
meetings, the venture capitalist discovered that the start-up company was in a different situation 
than they claimed to be. The venture capitalist felt that the entrepreneur hid some things about 
the start-up company. Thus, the venture capitalist decided to leave the negotiation. From this 
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case, it can be seen that the trust and the transparency were thought as very essential factors by 
the venture capitalist. 
4.3 Case C 
The characteristics of case C is summarized in the following table: 
Table 4. 3 Characteristics of Case C 
Fairness Category Example 
Distributive fairness Invested less than planned, received less ownership than 
proposed, but had a second investor involved 
 
Procedural fairness Explained the mission and expectations 
 
Interpersonal fairness Respect, trust, faith and chemistry were crucial 
 
Informational fairness Effective communication, all documents were available  
Negotiation Strategy  
Problem solving 
strategy 
High concern for both parties   
Coded Concepts  
Property rights Fair allocation of ownership 
 
Control rights Be willing to change the team 
 
Rationality If the arguments seemed rational, the venture capitalist 
would accept 
 
Transparency Be open upfront 
 
In this case, the venture capitalist first heard of the start-up company when the founder contacted 
the VC firm by email. From the first contact to the signing of the deal, it took approximately 5 
months. During these 5 months, two-way communication went smoothly and going at a steady 
speed and where all the necessary documents were provided by the entrepreneur, all aspects of 
informational fairness.  The venture capitalist pointed out that it was important that both parties 
were open at the very first meeting to establish trust. Therefore, soon after the venture capitalist 
received the proposal and decided to go further with the entrepreneur, the she laid out their 
expectations and mission in this deal. These actions indicate that the venture capitalist views 
transparency as an important factor to build trust and that she practiced procedural fairness. 
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When experiencing disagreements and conflicts, the venture capitalist commented that they 
“spend a lot of time on talking and discussing to build trust”, which is a matter of interpersonal 
fairness. The venture capitalist explained that most of the disagreements aroused during the 
negotiation of terms and conditions in the term sheet. Because many entrepreneurs are unfamiliar 
with how the venture capital industry works, they have a subjective standpoint when negotiating 
with VCs. The venture capitalist said that they explained why they needed these proposed terms 
and “changed the way of communication when the entrepreneur didn’t agree/understand”. The 
venture capitalist explained that it was important that they “convinced each other that they were 
a match” when both parties were mutually interested in a successful outcome even though there 
were conflicts. For example, when the venture capitalist exercised control rights by proposing 
that the management team needed a modification because it was not competent enough, it was 
not well received by the entrepreneur. The venture capitalist expressed that she believed that this 
will benefit the daily operation of the start-up company and implied that a change in the 
management team was the best solution to achieve this. They managed to come to terms with 
each other and the team was changed. The venture capitalist concluded that it was important to 
stay rational in any kind of conflict: 
 
  “if the arguments seems rational, then we will accept it”    
Venture capitalist, Case C 
 
Initially, Firm 3 was the only investor involved in the negotiation. The size of the property rights 
and the size of investment were already confirmed by both parties, but the deal was not signed 
yet. At the last minute, another VCs (an acquaintance of the VC firm) entered the negotiation and 
jointly invested in the start-up company. In the light of this last involvement and in terms of 
distributive fairness, the venture capitalist invested less money than they initially had planned, 
and the ownership shares were diluted. The venture capitalist of Case C was contended with the 
final result because they had an external investor that not only contributed with money, but also 
acted as the start-up company’s CTO and did the technical evaluation of the start-up company 
during the due diligence. 
 
52 
 
The venture capitalist pointed out that the reason they decided to invest was mainly because of 
two criteria: mutual trust and faith, and that the people were right (the venture capitalist liked the 
founder). Another important criterion, which the venture capitalist noticed from early on is, 
chemistry.  First and foremost, they have to like each other to be able to cooperate. Second, they 
need to be on the same page, for example, when discussing the business model. And lastly, they 
need to have common goals.  
 
The venture capitalist chose the problem-solving strategy as the strategy that most closely 
resemblances the way she negotiates. She explained that she cared about both parties obtaining 
their desired interests.  
 
Negotiations that failed and resulted in unsuccessful outcomes were mostly due to the 
incompetence of the founder or management team. Other problems were disagreements about the 
pricing and capital requirements. The venture capitalist explained that too much was at stake if 
she considered investing in a start-up company that had these kinds of problems. 
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4.4 Case D 
The characteristics of case D is summarized in the following table: 
 
Table 4. 4 Characteristics of Case D 
Fairness Category Example 
Distributive fairness Received less ownership than intended to obtain 
 
Procedural fairness Did not tell the start-up company the future negotiation 
processes 
 
Interpersonal fairness Both parties trusted each other upfront 
 
Informational fairness Quick responses and clear feedbacks 
Negotiation Strategy  
Contending strategy High concern for own interests 
Coded Concepts  
Property rights The allocation of ownership was fair 
 
Control rights Changed the management team 
 
Rationality Arguments should be supported by the facts and reasons 
 
Transparency Be straight and honest from the beginning 
 
In this case, the venture capitalist had been “monitoring” the start-up company for some time 
before they decided to arrange a meeting. They conducted an initial investigation on this start-up 
company in terms of technology, market and other related aspects. They concluded that the start-
up company was overall suitable for their investment profile. However, after several meetings, 
the venture capitalist noticed that the strategic abilities of the management team were not as good 
as they thought and they also learned that the team did not have enough capabilities to develop 
the start-up company rapidly. Besides that, both parties had very different opinions on the 
valuation. Thus, they (the venture capitalist) decided not to enter the formation phase of the 
strategic alliance. Around one year later, the start-up company launched its new product but the 
product did not penetrate the market, which resulted in capital shortage. This created the second 
opportunity for both parties to start a new negotiation for the strategic alliance. 
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After investigating and analyzing the start-up company, the VC firm understood the capital needs 
of the start-up company and proposed the desired amount of investment to the entrepreneur 
which he accepted. Given that the capital size of the investment was fixed, the ownership 
became one of the main issues for both sides. The VC firm intended to obtain more than 30% 
ownership of the start-up company, but finally reached an agreement on less than 30%. As the 
venture capitalist perceived, the entrepreneur cared deeply about the ownership shares and to 
reach an agreement, the venture capitalist compromised and decreased the number of shares to 
below 30%. But the amount of shares was still above the bottom limit for the VC firm. The VC 
thought the allocation of ownership was very fair for both parties. In aspects of fairness, these 
actions reflect that distributive fairness was very obvious and which lead to a fair allocation of 
property rights. 
 
In addition to the property rights, the control rights were also very important in this case. The 
venture capitalist was dissatisfied with the management team and insisted to modify it. The result 
was that the entrepreneur accepted the modification and half of the management team including 
the CEO were changed. Besides that, the venture capitalist also designed a new development 
strategy for the start-up company. Based on the actions above, the venture capitalist exercised a 
high level of control power and the allocation of control rights was not fair.  
 
In terms of interpersonal fairness, the venture capitalist mentioned that the both parties should 
trust each other from the beginning. As he said: “If there is no basic trust at the beginning, it is 
really unnecessary to keep on the following negotiation”. They brought all concerns to the table 
and discussed and analyzed these issues one by one. They were very rational in the negotiation 
because they usually used facts and figures to support their arguments (rationality). Regarding 
the informational fairness, the VC very satisfied with the quality of the communications between 
two firms and he thought the two sides were always very straight and open for each other in the 
whole negotiation process (transparency). He always received replies quickly and the feedbacks 
were very clear. He also responded to the start-up company’s questions quickly and explained 
every issue clearly. Therefore, the interpersonal fairness and the informational fairness indeed 
influenced the negotiation to a certain extent. 
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Even though the influence of the fairness (especially the distributive fairness) is seen in the case, 
the venture capitalist still emphasized: “I definitely concern more on our interests then on their 
interests”. He finally chose the contending strategy which cannot lead to the successful 
formation theoretically. However, it is important to understand the reason behind the choice in 
the case. The start-up company was in a emergency situation and were in urgent needs of capital 
needs. For the start-up company, the most important thing was to get enough capital to maintain 
the operation. Unfortunately, many investors lost substantial sums of money on the dot-com 
bubble
10
 in the early 2000s. Venture capital firms were more careful when considering to invest 
in internet based companies during that period of time. Therefore, for the start-up company in 
this case, it was difficult to acquire investment since this was during the dot-com bubble, which 
led to a weaker bargain power for the start-up company. For the VC firm, protecting their 
interests and minimizing the risk was the most essential factors when investing in internet based 
companies during this period, creating a stronger bargaining position. This can explain why the 
contending strategy worked in this case. 
 
Our interviewee shared his experience of unsuccessful cases, he pointed out that the valuation 
was the main “killer” in for the successful formation of the strategic alliance. In his previous 
experience, many entrepreneurs overly valued their start-up companies, which lead that it was so 
difficult to agree on the amount of investment and the shares of ownership (property rights in 
our study). Thus, it is considered that the allocation of the property rights had influence on the 
successful formation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
10
 The dot-com bubble was a stock market bubble which popped to near-devastating effects in 2001. 
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4.5 Case E 
The characteristics of case E is summarized in the following table: 
 
Table 4. 5 Characteristics of Case E 
 
In this case, the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur met at the Connect Forum where the 
entrepreneur gave a presentation about his idea. After the presentation, the venture capitalist and 
the entrepreneur met for discussion and the venture capitalist liked the idea and the entrepreneur. 
Therefore, the venture capitalist decided to proceed further with this case. 
 
At the time of the first meeting at the conference, the product was still under development. The 
whole negotiation process took approximately 6 weeks, which is the fastest case in our research. 
Because this was only an idea, and the product was still under development and there were no 
other interested parties involved, the venture capitalist performed the due diligence before the 
term sheet. They wanted to understand the business model, the idea and the capital needs – the 
total value based on the idea. Since the venture capitalist believed in the idea and the 
entrepreneur, they proceeded to the term sheet negotiation. 
Fairness Category Example 
Distributive fairness Amount of ownership shares given was equal to the 
intended amount 
 
Procedural fairness Future processes were explained to the entrepreneur 
 
Interpersonal fairness Chemistry and trust are most important factors 
 
Informational fairness Communication was fast and good 
Negotiation Strategy  
Problem solving strategy High concern for both parties 
Coded Concepts  
Property rights Invested 10 MNOK, received 40-45% ownership shares 
 
Rationality The venture capitalist needed proof of what the 
entrepreneur said 
 
Transparency Openness was essential 
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In terms of the property rights, the venture capitalist comments: “We pretty much got what we 
wanted. You make up your mind about what you roughly want, right [...], but of course, it also 
depends in the investment size”. 
 
The entrepreneur was “generous” and was willing to give away half (50-55%) of the company to 
the venture capitalist, but the venture capitalist was not positive to the suggestion: 
 
“We want the founder to hold a significantly stake in the company [...]. It’s the motivation, he 
has to think ‘oh, it is still my company and I’m not working for the VC firm’, then he will just be 
an employee. Especially as an entrepreneur, you are driven because you want to build something 
[...]. You want him to succeed” 
Venture capitalist, Case E 
 
The venture capitalist had set out for a high ownership share, higher what he usually would 
demand because of the risks that bored with the investment of an unfinished product and the 
capital requirement proposed by the entrepreneur. The venture capitalist decided to settle for the 
amount of shares he initially intended for, which was below the amount proposed by the 
entrepreneur, but he received the capital he needed (distributive fairness). 
 
The venture capitalist expressed that the most important factors for determining whether to 
invest or not, lies in the belief in the idea, the team, trust, openness and the “gut” feeling. He 
explains that it is not so much about the idea itself, but that there is belief in the idea and that the 
team is competent enough to actually execute the idea. The venture capitalist emphasizes that 
both parties have to be able to trust each other and have certain chemistry (a matter of 
interpersonal fairness), and be open towards one another. Also, he emphasizes that it is important 
that the he can trust what the entrepreneur says and provide proof for what he has said 
(rationality). 
 
Given the short time spectra of the negotiation, the venture capitalist described the two-way 
communication quality as good and timely feedbacks was provided by both parties. In terms of 
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procedural fairness, the venture capitalist informs the entrepreneur about the way they operate 
and explains the next steps in the process. 
 
The venture capitalist concluded the interviewee by choosing the problem-solving strategy, 
which he explained as the importance to consider both parties’ interests and needs.  
 
The negotiations that failed to result in a successful alliance were due to the lack of belief in the 
idea or product or internal issues within the VC firm. 
4.6 Case F 
The majority of this firm’s investments are in growth stage, but they also invest in early stages 
within the industry of advanced technology. With the strict cooperation agreement between the 
venture capital firm and the invested firm, it was not possible to gain too much access to some 
detailed information about this case, e.g., shares of ownership. The coded frame is showed in 
Table 4.6. 
Table 4. 6 Characteristics of Case F 
Fairness Category Example 
Distributive fairness No big difference between the initial goal and final 
outcome 
 
Procedural fairness Explained negotiation procedures to the entrepreneur and 
made him/her open 
 
Interpersonal fairness The investment was about trust;  
 
Informational fairness Communication within timeline 
Negotiation Strategy  
Compromising strategy Moderate concern for both parties 
Coded Concepts  
Transparency Openness was important during the negotiation process; 
Mutual understanding 
 
In this case, during the six-month negotiation period, the VCs were focusing on the importance 
of cooperation and the necessity of making a concession to better solutions when disagreements 
emerged. For this reason, he defined to use compromising strategy. He pointed that every 
negotiation was starting at the understanding of the company, including its financial situation, 
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customers, and business model. The following steps, such as setting up term sheet and 
proceeding due diligence, were based on mutual understanding of each other. Besides that, the 
management team in the company was very important as well.  In addition, he was emphasizing 
on the crucial role that openness played when negotiating, which was coded as transparency. He 
comments as follows: 
 
“You need to put everything very clear in the beginning, how we are thinking, how our 
process [negotiation process] is. That is a good first step. Then you need to transcribe 
them to the other side […]. You should always keep in mind that what both sides think 
and how you behave […]. Being transparent, transparent, transparent” 
Venture Capitalist, Case F 
 
Based on our question guide, the venture capitalist agreed the viewpoint of the importance of 
trust which he believed that it is always the key in every business. But the method of building 
trust is very tailor-made. The question of how to establish trust in a very limited period is to be 
discussed further in future research. 
 
However, it was not possible to get too much information about neither the amount of investment 
nor shares of ownership, which constrain our understanding of how property rights work in the 
negotiation process.  
 
When talking about unsuccessful negotiation cases, the answers are quite clear, which is:  
 
“Things [this business] appears not to be true in our due diligence report, and the seller 
understood the withdrawal of offer [...] ” 
 
Venture capitalist, Case F 
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4.7 Case G 
The characteristics of case G is summarized in the following table: 
 
Table 4. 7 Characteristics of Case G 
Fairness Category Example 
Distributive fairness High ownership shares, low investment, but during bad 
times; 
The received amount of shares was not far from the 
amount proposed by the entrepreneur 
 
Procedural fairness Provided a time schedule 
 
Interpersonal fairness Trust and respect were important 
 
Informational fairness Good response time, effective, all documents available 
Negotiation Strategy  
Problem solving strategy High concern for both parties 
Coded Concepts  
Property rights Received 38% shares of ownership 
 
Control rights Changed 2/3 of the management team 
 
In this case, the entrepreneur found Firm 7 through his network and contacted them by telephone. 
This case differs from the other cases in that the start-up company was running out of cash at the 
time of the negotiation. The entire negotiation process took approximately 1 year. The reason for 
the long negotiation time was that Firm 7, who holds two funds under management (one for early 
stage start-ups and one for middle stage companies) assessed the company as a middle stage 
company. But later, as negotiation went by and they agreed on the term sheet, and the venture 
capitalist performed a due diligence, they discovered that the company had product development 
issues, which was also the reason why they needed more money, and concluded that the 
company was too “early stage” to be assessed as a middle stage company. According to the 
venture capitalist, the development process was slower than anticipated, almost reaching a 
critical point. A new evaluation was performed on the company and the terms and conditions on 
the term sheet were changes. 
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The venture capitalist settled for a higher ownership share (property rights) than what they first 
proposed and a little higher than what the entrepreneur was willing to give due to the problems 
discovered during the due diligence and that the venture capitalist had to consider the risks of 
investing in a company in this condition. Therefore, the proposed investment was low, lower 
than what the entrepreneur expected. With these facts, the venture capitalist felt that this was an 
appropriate offer (distributive fairness). But, given the fact that the start-up company was 
“running out of money and didn’t have any other alternatives” (Venture capitalist, Case G) and 
that this was in 2008, during the financial crisis, the start-up company settled for the proposed 
offer. In addition, the venture capitalist also used his control rights to change 2/3 of the team in 
close cooperation with the founder. 
 
During the first negotiation, a brief time schedule was presented by the venture capitalist about 
the upcoming events. It was important for the venture capitalist to understand the company, the 
business model and whether they wanted to go further or not, which they did. The beginning was 
less structured, but the later stages were more defined. These actions indicate procedural fairness. 
The venture capitalist pointed out that the communication between the two parties was very 
efficient and had a very good response time (informational fairness). Also, the entrepreneur 
provided him with all the material that he needed. 
 
The venture capitalist concluded that the most important factors for investing were that the 
people/team was right, mutual trust and respect (interpersonal fairness), and that they were able 
to build the company and create value for the company. If these facts are missing, then, 
according to the venture capitalist, he will not invest.  The venture capitalist believed he used the 
problem-solving strategy during the negotiations because he was equally concerned about both 
parties’ outcomes. 
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5. Discussion of findings 
In order to extend our understanding of previous literature based on negotiation theory and 
fairness theory, these two main theories are used to analyze the empirical data collected on the 
successful strategic alliance formation cases. The proceeding chapter examines how negotiation 
strategies explain the preceding seven cases. The proposed framework will illustrate the 
connection between fairness perception and negotiation outcomes. Leading to propositions based 
on the findings from the aforementioned analysis. 
5.1 Implementation of prior literatures 
From the interview data, it was discovered that most of the interviewees chose problem-solving 
strategy (four out of seven), two interviewees chose compromising strategy, and one chose 
contending strategy. It is obvious to understand venture capitalists’ choices of problem-solving 
and compromising strategy by the reason that every deal needs to be fair in VCs’ opinions, or 
referred as: “equal concern for both parties’ interests”. The differences between compromising 
strategy and problem-solving strategy are discussed respectively in the next sections. 
 
Compromising strategy, firms that are moderately cooperative, flexible, and short-term oriented 
will pursue this strategy (Das & Kumar, 2011).  The compromising strategy seeks some fair 
balance where both parties appear to get an equitable deal (Pruitt, 1991). People using this 
strategy are seeking to: optimize their solutions of short-term cooperation, and it is not so 
significant to have the very best outcomes. It also means that both parties, to a great extent, need 
to make sacrifices. Such an interpretation indicates a compromising strategy can hardly avoid 
potential conflicts arising from not solving all the problems. As Das and Kumar (2011) said: 
“Choosing compromising strategy in the formation phase will not achieve an integrative 
outcome”. During the negotiation process, negotiators who use compromising strategy tend to 
see the other party as worthy and equal to themselves. Therefore, the negotiators are looking for 
a fair process and outcome. Negotiators employing compromising strategy realize no one will 
get everything desired. So, negotiators can pursue an equitable arrangement through the use of 
alternatives. On the other hand, it is also noticed that those venture capitalists that chose 
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compromising strategy during the negotiation process always held a very high opinion or 
mutual respect and trust of the other party. 
 
Problem-solving strategy is defined as increasing available resources, compensation, exchanging 
concessions on low priority issues, minimizing the costs of concessions, and creating new 
mutually beneficial options (Pruitt, 1991). The feature of problem-solving strategy is: yielding 
the very best beneficial outcomes and hardly relinquishing their own needs. The problem-solving 
strategy is suitable for the situation where both parties pursue the high integrative potential and 
long-term cooperation with high aspirations (Pruitt, 1991). 
 
The problem-solving strategy is similar to the compromising strategy in many ways. Venture 
capitalists choosing this strategy expressed that he or she does not treat the other party as a 
competitor, but rather as a potential cooperation partner who has legitimate requirements. On 
one hand, the negotiators are looking for reasonable solutions that can make them work together 
over a very long term. On the other hand, the negotiators pursue a suitable way to understand 
the other side’s situation, where he or she can find a solution that will meet both sides’ needs to 
a great extent.  
 
From this viewpoint, it is considered that most venture capitalists prefer making the choice of 
applying problem-solving strategy in the negotiation process for the reason of pursuing 
beneficial outcomes without losing too much of their needs and rights. From another standpoint, 
some people may choose compromising strategy with equitable arrangement by using 
alternatives. Although one interviewee chose a contending strategy during the negotiation 
process, it is found that internet based firms had little leverage in investment negotiations during 
2000 the dot-com bubble burst. In the background of this business cycle, it is understandable 
VCs’ hesitation make investments in start-up companies. From the VCs’ perspective, protecting 
their interests by minimizing risk exposure became the most crucial factors when investing in 
internet based companies during this period. Compared with the other six cases, this case was an 
exceptional one. 
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Das and Kumar (2011) argued that negotiators may employ different negotiation strategies which 
will influence the negotiation outcome (deal/no deal) in the phase of alliance formation. 
Specifically, a problem-solving strategy will lead to a successful strategic alliance formation by 
developing mutual trust or strengthening pre-existing relationships; a contending strategy will 
not make a successful strategic alliance formation; neither a yielding strategy nor a 
compromising strategy will achieve an integrative outcome (Das & Kumar, 2011). Das and 
Kumar’s study is considered as one of the most remarkable references in this research by laying 
a theoretical foundation to build on. In order to better understand the implications of problem-
solving and compromising strategy, the seven VC cases will be analyzed further during the 
following paragraphs. 
 
From the interview data, it is considered that the property rights concern mutual financial 
benefits between the venture capital firms and start-up companies. Meanwhile, a problem-
solving strategy emphasizes creating new mutually beneficial options by yielding the very best 
outcomes and hardly giving up their own needs. Therefore, the conflicts arising from the 
allocation of property rights can be effectively solved by using problem-solving strategy. For 
example, Case E implies that venture capitalists always have an idea of how much ownership 
shares they want in accordance with the investment size, but at the same time it is important that 
the entrepreneur himself holds a certain amount of property rights in his own company so that he 
knows (the entrepreneur) that he still owns the company and maintains the motivation of 
building the company to prosper. It is concluded that in a situation where both parties pay 
attention to each other’s needs, the two sides likely to choose the problem-solving strategy that 
can help strengthen the relationship and contribute to a positive outcome (Tjosvold et al.,1999).  
 
On one hand, the VCs and entrepreneurs had a mutual understanding which made them 
understand each other’s real concerns. On the other hand, the high degree of trust would make 
VCs and entrepreneurs more willing to give up something. As the venture capitalist in Case B 
mentioned: “give up something which is not so important to us but very crucial to the 
entrepreneurs”. By applying this kind of strategy of compromising, many conflicts can be 
avoided in the negotiation and VCs and entrepreneurs can try to achieve a balance agreement. In 
the light of these findings, it is proposed that if the relationship between the venture capitalist 
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and the entrepreneur is strong, then the venture capitalist may use a compromising strategy, as a 
comprising strategy has been found to be high on relational appropriateness (Gross & Guerrero, 
2000).  
 
Considering Pruitt’s (1991) research, compromising strategy desires fair balance where both 
sides appear to get an equitable deal. In Euwema’s (2003) study, compromising strategy is 
expected to enhance relational satisfaction which helps to achieve both sides’ interests. The VCs 
and entrepreneurs with mutual trust and understanding would like to select this strategy for 
avoiding conflicts and look for an equitable solution for both sides, leading to a successful 
alliance between the VC firm and the start-up company. Based on Das and Kumar’s (2011) 
research, companies that are moderately cooperative, moderately ﬂexible, and short-term 
oriented will pursue this strategy. Even though this strategy cannot lead to achieving an 
integrative outcome (Das & Kumar, 2011), that is, negotiating parties may be willing to make 
concessions but may resist doing the same on issues that are important to them (Das & Kumar, 
2011), it can still result in a successful outcome. Most strategic alliances are short-term and the 
cooperation of the VC firm and the start-up company is usually flexible. Thus, compromising 
strategy could be an effective strategy in the strategic alliance negotiations and can lead to a 
successful formation. The two cases from Case B and Case F showed as much.  
 
By examining previous articles about these theoretical negotiation strategies in a real-world 
context, the significant effect of problem-solving strategy that will lead both sides to make an 
agreement of investment in alliance formation phase has been successfully proven; the findings 
from the seven cases indicates that compromising strategy based on mutual trust or transparent 
information sharing will also lead to a successful alliance in the formation phase, which has 
empirically complemented the due concern framework to some extent. In addition, not too much 
information is found about contending and yielding strategy in this study. 
 
5.2 New findings based on fairness theory 
Venture capitalists may hold extensive control rights, including the right of decision-making and 
even the right to change the top management team in the start-up company (Hellmann, 1998). 
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Mostly, the issue of control rights focuses on the top management team. Venture capitalists 
might argue that excellent a top management team will add value to the company, while founders 
or entrepreneurs tend to employ management team in their personal interest or attachment as 
opposed to the interest of the company (Hellmann, 1998). The typical venture capital deal 
includes the shareholder agreement and the employment agreement (Testa, 1997; Timmons, 
1999). The property rights approach takes the point of view that the possession of control rights 
is crucial for the integration decision (Hart & Moore, 1990). That is, if the venture capital firm 
wants to acquire part of the entrepreneurial firm’s profit stream, it can always do this by contract. 
 
The shareholder agreement specifies the allocation of shares held by the entrepreneur, 
management team, and investors. The percentage of ownership given to each party depends on 
the particular situation of the start-up company. There is no specific answer of how much 
ownership the company has to share in order to get the investment. According to our interview 
data, the ownership percentage acquired by venture capital firms varies from 20% to 50%. As 
perceived from the interviews, the greater the potential return perceived by VCs, the less 
ownership they may require. It is also important to note that some VCs pay more attention to the 
entrepreneurial team per se than the innovative idea. Even though the business idea may be good 
– the marketable product has great potential to seize the consumer market – the idea may still be 
duplicated by others. However, an entrepreneurial team with ability, wisdom and good chemistry 
is extremely difficult to replicate. Although many researchers only emphasize the importance of 
the product itself, it is considered that the team is even more significant in practice. One of our 
interviewees’ comments reveals as much: 
 
“There are hundreds of companies that contact us every year. We need to screen these 
companies and can only invest in 1% or 2% of them. One of the most important reasons 
that attract our attention is the capability of the team. We have to like the team. We know 
that no matter how great the idea is, it will be copied somehow, or maybe someone else 
has the same idea. But the team, people, cannot be copied. So, I believe the team is most 
valuable for us” 
Venture capitalist, Case E 
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Some venture capitalists express that they expect the top management team to operate their 
business without interference from investors. However, there are many VCs that state that they 
will participate in the daily operation of the invested company through the board of directors. For 
this reason, VCs usually acquire a seat on the board of directors during the negotiations, which 
may affect the future operations of the company. For instance, making the decision of changing 
the management team, some investors said that they may change the management team if he or 
she does not qualify for the held position in the company. One investor commented: 
 
“It is inevitable that some people [management team members] cannot make a difference 
to the business, well, they might be excellent in other fields but not in this position where 
we do our business. If so, we have to make our [VCs] decision of changing the team and 
find someone else qualified” 
Venture capitalist, Case C 
 
We are motivated by Rationality in our case study of analyzing negotiation process between VC 
firms and start-up companies. Rationality might be first defined in Simon’s bounded rationality 
theory, which is a concept traditionally used in the field of negotiation (De Carlo, 2011).  In this 
theory, negotiators’ cognitive and computational capacities are limited by outside constraints, 
especially in the rich information environment (De Carlo, 2011). For this reason, they may only 
choose satisfactory decisions and ignore exploring other better solutions. Some other researchers, 
like Tsay and Bazerman (2009), define rationality as lying outside the negotiators as human 
beings. Negotiators not only process the information by interpreting the negotiation situation, but 
also use cognitive processes effectively and limit biases as far as possible. Emotion must be 
controlled or avoided, for it will disrupt negotiators’ cognitive process (Fisher & Shapiro, 2006). 
 
Although it is difficult to apply the rationality theories from prior articles in this research, the 
theories help to better understand the concept of rationality to some extent. Thus, rationality in 
this study is perceived to be thinking consistent and forecast what might happen in the near 
future, making the decisions that maximizes both parties’ interests, and acting decently to help 
understand each other thoroughly. By emphasizing rationality during the negotiation process, it 
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will improve the possibility of maximizing negotiators’ interests and minimizing conflicts or 
disagreements. 
 
In the interviews, some interviewees in our study mentioned the term transparency. For example, 
the interviewee in Case C thought VCs and entrepreneurs should be open with each other from 
the beginning. The interviewee in Case D also holds the same opinion. The interviewee in Case F 
further pointed out that openness can lead to better mutual understanding in negotiations. Thus, 
transparency became one of our coded concepts. As Lamming mentioned (2006), wider 
information sharing can create transparency. So transparency is related to the informational 
fairness. Based on the previous research, transparency meant the effective communication and 
sensitive information sharing between VCs and entrepreneurs. Measurements for transparency 
are developed with questions such as:  
 
● Do the VC and the entrepreneur exchange information quickly?  
● Is the communication between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur intensive?  
● To what extent are they acting openness towards each other?  
● Do they disclosure sensitive information of their firms to each other?  
 
Fisher and Ury (1981) introduced BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement) as a 
tool for negotiators to help them understand their alternatives in a dispute and help reach 
agreements that satisfy their interests (Fisher & Ury, 1981). From the interviews, it is found that 
BATNA was useful to negotiate alternative solutions to resolve disagreements in a situation 
where the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur had a good relationship and a high perception 
of interpersonal fairness. Especially, when other aspects of the deal (business idea and team) 
seems reasonable, agreeable, and they (the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur) are hesitant 
with leaving the deal. Venture capitalists and entrepreneurs will turn to BATNA to rethink their 
interests and arguments, recognize their alternatives, which gives both parties a second chance to 
negotiate instead of walking away from the deal. This works both ways. It gives the opportunity 
to look at two different proposals and be able to compare them with each other. This allows both 
the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur to see things from another perspective - it can give 
them a “fresh start” on the negotiation and influence the final outcome. 
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Colquitt (2001) clearly defined the four types of fairness: procedural fairness, distributive 
fairness, interpersonal fairness, and informational fairness. He also developed a set of items to 
measure the four kinds of fairness, and the measurements he created became the foundation of 
the interview guide. Ariño and Ring (2010) also used the definition of fairness from Colquitt 
(2010) to conduct the research for their paper the role of fairness in the alliance formation. Their 
research showed the application of fairness in the alliance context, which also influenced the 
formulation of our research question. Their findings of the relationship between distributive 
fairness and property rights and the relationship between procedural fairness and control rights 
were also utilized in our study. 
 
It is noticed that each interviewee has perceived the four types of fairness, more or less, during 
their negotiation process with the start-up companies. Thus, it is believed that once a venture 
capitalist enters a negotiation process, he or she will perceive distributive, procedural, 
interpersonal, and informational fairness. The only difference for the VCs is the different extents 
of perceived fairness. For instance, some VCs may emphasize distributive fairness, while others 
might pay attention to interpersonal fairness. It is proposed in this thesis that the extent of 
fairness perception with the four types of fairness by the venture capitalist may affect the final 
outcome of the negotiation in the strategic alliance formation. However, the interactions between 
different types of fairness and negotiation outcome of successful alliance formation are not only 
determined by the perception of fairness itself, but also involve other variables. Thus, it is 
suggested that property rights and control rights play a significant role of connecting fairness 
perception and successful negotiation; BATNA, on the other hand, has a positive moderating 
effect on fairness perception to an agreement. The findings of this study have been framed in 
Figure 5.1, and our research propositions will be discussed further in the following section 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
 
Figure 5. 1 The perceptions of fairness in alliance formation framework 
 
5.3 Research propositions 
During the negotiation process between a venture capital firm and a start-up company, both sides 
have concerns over property rights. Property rights are defined as the right possessed by the 
owner of an asset where the owner has the ability to exclude others from the use of that asset 
(Hart & Moore, 1990), and that control over an asset can lead indirectly to control over human 
assets. Our findings shows that property rights (measured as ownership shares) are one of the 
most important factors in an alliance formation. It can be a bargaining chip for other terms and 
conditions in the term sheet, for example, the amount of investment, the number of 
representative on the board of directors, or the VCs wish to change the management team. The 
interview data shows that the allocation of ownership usually reflects the size of investment. 
These two variables (investment vs. property rights) tend to change, maybe several times, during 
a negotiation process. For VCs, the allocation of property rights is a natural process during a 
negotiation of alliance, but for the entrepreneur it is a hard reality to face. Many entrepreneurs 
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are passionate and emotional about their idea and their company. In their minds and hearts, they 
believe that they still own the whole company even after agreeing to an alliance, and cannot 
sometimes grasp the reality that they no longer own the company as a whole unit.  As most VCs 
understand the dilemma the entrepreneurs are going through, VCs will try to explain to the 
entrepreneurs that in a trade situation like this, both parties have to give something in return. 
According to the VCs, they want the entrepreneurs to hold stakes in the company and negotiate 
for it. For entrepreneurs, property rights are a motivational factor for building and creating value 
for the company.  If an entrepreneur does not fight to keep his ownership, then he may not be 
that motivated or concerned about his own company. According to a couple of VCs, some 
entrepreneurs are only interested in obtaining the investment to establish offices and buy 
expensive equipment, but do not really care about the business. In this situation, when the 
entrepreneur is not interested in negotiating and agrees to everything that is proposed, the VCs 
will usually start questioning the potential of this entrepreneur and the VCs might eventually 
walk away from the deal. The interview data shows that if the VCs are content with the 
allocation of property rights and thinks it is fairly distributed, the higher the chance for a 
successful outcome. Therefore, it is argued that the likelihood of reaching an agreement to form 
an alliance is greater when the VCs have a high perception of distributive fairness with a high 
reliance on the property rights. Thereby, the following proposition is raised: 
 
Proposition 1: The higher the VCs perceived distributive fairness with a reliance on the property 
rights, the higher is the possibility for a successful strategic alliance formation. 
 
 
The analysis is motivated by rationality in the case of analyzing negotiation process between VC 
firms and start-up companies. According to the venture capitalists’ expressions, it is coded that 
rationality is the degree of:  
 
● collecting relevant comprehensive information 
● thinking consistently to forecast what might happen in the near future 
● making the decision that maximizes both parties’ interests 
● acting decently to help understand both sides better 
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Therefore, the measurements of rationality with the following questions are adopted: 
 
● To what degree did you collect relevant information? 
● To what degree did you think potential possibilities of conflicts or disagreements? 
● To what degree did you maximize both parties’ interests? 
● To what degree did you make the other side to understand?  
 
These questions were not asked directly, for the reason that it is hard to get a 0-100 score answer 
to these questions. Therefore, these questions were kept in mind during open conversations and 
summarizing the VCs’ opinions while talking about the negotiation process. Generally, 
rationality can only be determined either by an emphasized or an ordinary tone based on what the 
VCs have done related to the VCs’ information collection, disaster forecast, mutual understand, 
decision making and actions. 
 
According to our interview data, the VC in Case A improved the possibility of maximizing 
negotiators’ interests and minimizing conflicts or disagreements by emphasizing rationality 
during the negotiation process with the entrepreneur. As more interviews took place, this 
viewpoint has been shown to be effective from the VCs’ experiences. One of the venture 
capitalists commented: 
 
“You need to explain to them [entrepreneurs] what the product is, who your potential 
customers are, or other possibilities […], and make them understand what we are going 
to do. We try to bring them [disagreements] down to something that can be manageable 
and discussed […], that’s the only way to solve problems” 
Venture capitalist, Case A 
 
Considering our measurements of procedural fairness (see Appendix 3 Justice Measure Items), 
rationality may be thought of as one of the indicators to procedural fairness. For example, 
rationality can reflect procedural consistency, which partly belongs to procedural fairness in the 
negotiation process. It is believed that the VCs focus on rationality indicates they have a very 
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high perception of procedural fairness. Specifically, they emphasize rationality by both parties 
through the need to comprehensively collect all relevant information, maximize both parties’ 
interests by eliminating biases, and effective communication. The above discussion leads us to 
the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2a:  The greater the VCs’ emphasis on rationality by both parties, the higher the VC 
may perceive procedural fairness during the negotiation process.  
 
 
Like property rights, the allocation of control rights is another major issue in the negotiation of 
the strategic company alliance formation. Control rights decide how much control power the VC 
firm will have and how much influence it can bring to the operations of the start-up company, 
which is of equal importance to both the venture capitalist and entrepreneur during negotiations. 
For VCs, investing in a start-up company does not only mean investing capital, but also investing 
other related resources such as their industrial abilities, network and business experience. In 
other words, the VC firm provides a solution to help the start-up company quickly develop. Thus, 
the VCs have to have a certain amount of control power to ensure solutions are implemented in 
the start-up company, thereby keeping the start-up company on the right development track. 
Some VCs thought the control right of the management team was important. The interviewee 
from Case C wanted to change the management team when investing the start-up companies. 
The interviewee in Case D also thought the VC firm should have the right to change the 
management team if the VCs thought the team was not capable. Generally, some VCs paid much 
attention on the allocation of the control rights.   
 
According to Ariño and Ring’s (2010) research, a fairness allocation of control rights is 
influenced by reciprocal perceptions of procedural fairness. If the negotiation process was highly 
influenced by the perception of procedural fairness, it might lead to a fair allocation of control 
rights. As mentioned earlier, the control rights are essential for both parties. Both sides will try 
their best to gain more control power for themselves because of self-interests. That is why 
numerous problems about control rights arise in negotiations. Because of the perception of 
procedural fairness, the problems may be solved in the negotiation process. During negotiations, 
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if both parties expressed their concerns of the control rights directly, the mutual understanding 
for both sides were generated and they could reconsider what was more important to the VC firm 
and the start-up company. Influenced by the perception of procedural fairness, the allocation of 
control rights would be fair for the VCs and the entrepreneurs. This solution may be agreeable to 
both parties and also create the possibility of increasing the common benefits. This kind of 
agreement can be called a ‘win-win’ agreement. Once the issue of how to allocate control rights 
has been resolved to a ‘win-win’ situation, it will increase the probability of making an 
investment agreement. Hence, the following proposition is raised: 
 
Proposition 2b: The higher the VCs perceive procedural fairness through a reliance on control 
rights, the higher the possibility of a successful strategic alliance formation. 
 
 
According to our interview data, it is found that not all VCs think of the property rights and 
control rights as the most important issues in negotiations. In Case B, the venture capitalist 
mentioned he and his partners are not driven by the shares of ownership and believe that the trust 
and respect between venture capitalists and the entrepreneurs are the most important factors in 
negotiations. The interviewee in Case F also pointed out that sometimes negotiations are all 
about trust. According to the previous literature review on fairness, the degree of trust and 
respect can be used to measure the perception of the interpersonal fairness. 
 
All the interviewees from the seven cases admitted that trust and respect influenced the 
negotiations, but only the interviewees in Case B and Case F paid more attention to trust and 
respect in their cases. After reviewing the data from the two cases, an interesting point was found: 
the VCs previously knew or worked with the entrepreneurs. Several VCs mentioned that VCs 
and entrepreneurs had the basic mutual trust and respect from the beginning and then built the 
trust in the following negotiation process. Compared with the other five cases, the degree of 
initial trust and respect in Case B and Case F was higher due to the longer relationship between 
the parties. The VCs were familiar with the behavioral styles of the entrepreneurs and understood 
their ways of thinking. The mutual understanding could help the VCs in Case B and Case F to 
build a higher degree of trust in the following negotiation and avoid personal conflicts. To 
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summarize, the VCs in Case B and Case F had a higher degree of trust and respect upfront and 
further built up the relationships in the following negotiations. In other words, the interpersonal 
fairness perceived by interviewees in Case B and Case F was more than the interpersonal 
fairness perceived by the rest interviewees.  
 
The alliance formation might benefit from the more perception of interpersonal fairness. First, 
the personal conflicts might be avoided in the negotiation because of mutual respects, which 
built a good foundation for the negotiation process. Second, the mutual trust created the good 
atmosphere for the negotiations, which eased the negotiation. Third, the mutual trust might make 
them have better understanding of each other’s teams, which was thought of as one of the most 
important factors by some VCs. At last, influenced by the perception of interpersonal fairness, 
VCs and entrepreneurs might consider each other as the suitable partners in the following works 
and would be willing to work together, which might have encouraged them to form the alliance. 
Therefore, leading to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3a: The higher the VCs perceive interpersonal fairness, the higher the possibility of 
a successful strategic alliance formation. 
 
 
The interviews showed that reaching an agreement between the VCs and the entrepreneur is a 
very complex matter. There are many terms and conditions that need to be negotiated between 
the VCs and the entrepreneurs, and they do not always manage to reach a successful agreement 
due to differences of opinion. The interview data showed that the relationship between the 
venture capitalist and the entrepreneur may affect the outcome of the negotiation. Most important 
is how the VCs perceive the entrepreneurs with regard to trust and respect. All the VCs that were 
interviewed were clear that a framework to build trust and respect has to be in place from the 
beginning and that trust is earned. If disagreements arise when trust and respect is weak or do not 
exist between the venture capitalists and the entrepreneurs, then the VCs would back off the deal 
and avoid spending more time, money, and effort on the negotiation. If interpersonal fairness is 
obviously present between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur, then a BATNA may be 
presented to solve the disagreements between the two parties. 
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The preformed relationship between the venture capitalist and entrepreneur in Case B suggests 
that this relationship creates a higher level of trust and respect between the two parties, where the 
venture capitalist have a positive perception of interpersonal fairness. It suggests that a high 
perception of interpersonal fairness between VCs and entrepreneurs may lead to greater efforts to 
solve conflicts and disagreements during a negotiation by presenting a BATNA to reach an 
agreement. A BATNA can help both parties understand their options and see the negotiation 
from a different perspective. Therefore, the venture capitalist is also more willing to spend 
additional time and effort on the negotiation. A BATNA can influence the negotiation power and 
make both parties aware of their alternatives and be more confident in negotiating a solution that 
serves both interests and loosen up the disagreements (Fisher & Ury, 1981). In light of these 
observations and arguments, the following proposition is raised: 
 
Proposition 3b: BATNA may have a positive moderating effect on negotiating a successful 
strategic alliance formation. 
 
 
According to the previous literature review, the informational fairness is perceived by the VCs 
and entrepreneurs when the information exchange is effective. In negotiations, the quick 
response and high quality communication can ensure the efficiency of the information exchange. 
In each interview, all the venture capitalists mentioned that the communication between 
themselves and the entrepreneurs was good. The venture capitalist in Case C thought the speed 
of information exchange was very quick. She commented that “the quicker the company needs 
the money, the faster the communication is”. As noted from the interviewee in Case D, the 
response time was very short for both sides. Differ from the previous two venture capitalists, the 
venture capitalist in Case B emphasized the quality of the communication. He thought the clear 
and rational exchange of information was very important in the negotiation. Generally, the quick 
response and clear communication could make venture capitalists perceive a basic degree of 
informational fairness.  
 
In negotiations, dishonesty usually decreases the perception of fairness. For example, during the 
negotiation process between a VC firm and a start-up company, the entrepreneur may hide 
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unfavorable information in order to gain the investment. However, the VCs would eventually 
discover the truth during the due diligence process and treat this dishonest behavior as cheating. 
In most cases, the VCs decide not to invest in the end.  “[To] lie is the worst” as the venture 
capitalist in Case B said. In his opinion, the VCs and entrepreneurs should be open to each other, 
which may increase the perception of information fairness.  
 
As mentioned earlier, in Cases B and F the VCs knew the entrepreneurs prior to their 
negotiations. Because of their personal relationship, the communication between the two parties 
in both cases might be more intensive than that in the other five cases. Besides that, they were 
familiar with their style of talking and expressions, which might make them to understand each 
other easily and also avoid misunderstandings. In other words, the information exchange in the 
two cases was clearer. Thus, the efficiency of communication based on pre-personal connection 
might be higher than the first encounter. The venture capitalists in the two cases may perceive 
more informational fairness. 
 
In Case B and Case F, the intensive and clear communications made the VCs and the 
entrepreneurs share more information and effectively increase the mutual understanding. 
According to Lamming and his colleagues’ (2006) research, wider information sharing can 
create transparency. Besides that, the possibility of sharing important information is also higher 
in the two cases because of the intensive communications and mutual understanding. In the 
coded concepts, effective communication and sensitive information sharing between participants 
in negotiations were thought of as transparency. Thus, transparency can be thought of as the 
result of the high perception of informational fairness.  
 
Because of the high perception of informational fairness, the VCs and entrepreneurs in Case B 
and Case F understood each other’s core interests and important concerns in the negotiation 
process. On one hand, each party might give up some interests which were not so important for 
them to avoid conflicts. Fewer conflicts might result in the more smooth negotiation process and 
increase the possibility of alliance formation. On the other hand, they could propose a solution 
based on the concerns from both sides. The better solution might be accepted easier by both 
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parties, thereby increasing the chance of alliance formation. Therefore, the fourth proposition 
was: 
 
Proposition 4: The higher the VCs perceive the entrepreneurs’ understanding of informational 
fairness, the more likely are both parties to act transparent towards each other, which may 
increase the chance of a successful strategic alliance formation.   
 
 
According to the current interview data, it is difficult to conclude which type of fairness is the 
most significant in strategic alliance formation between venture capital firms and start-up 
companies. From this research, it can be only summarized that all these four types of fairness 
play an important role during the negotiation process from the venture capitalists’ viewpoint. 
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6. Implications and conclusions 
6.1 Conclusions 
Strategic alliances between venture capital firms and start-up companies can enhance the 
competitive advantage by discovering new opportunities and exploit new skills and resources. 
Although strategic alliances have become a popular method for business development, the 
process of forming an alliance is a difficult barrier to cross. As one of the most critical issues in 
the alliance formation phase, the negotiation process has been an important research subject for 
numerous academics. During the last two decades, the practice of negotiation has been 
influenced by the perception of fairness.  Regarding recent studies about implementation of 
fairness theory, researchers have recognized the tendency for negotiators to perceive fairness 
when they negotiate. 
 
Our interview data have implied the fact that every venture capitalist has perceived the four types 
of fairness (distributive fairness, procedural fairness, interpersonal fairness and informational 
fairness) during the negotiation process with the entrepreneurs. Based on these finding, 
understanding of the research question is further developed: How do perceptions of fairness 
affect negotiation outcomes during strategic alliance formation between VC firms and start-up 
companies? In order to address this question, we suggested that even though each venture 
capitalist may have a perception of the four types of fairness, the significant difference of the 
four types to the VCs is the different levels of perceived fairness. For example, some VCs may 
emphasize distributive fairness, while others might pay attention to interpersonal fairness.  
 
It is proposed in this thesis that the extent of fairness perception with the four types of fairness by 
the venture capitalist may affect the final outcome of the negotiation in the alliance formation. 
However, the interactions between the different types of fairness and negotiation outcome of a 
successful alliance formation are not only determined by the perception of fairness itself, but also 
involve other variables. Thus, it is suggested that property rights and control rights play a 
significant role of connecting fairness perception and successful negotiation. BATNAs, on the 
other hand, have a positive moderating effect on fairness perception and the final outcome.  
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Our interview data suggests that both problem-solving and compromising strategies may lead to 
successful strategic alliance formations. By examining previous articles about these theoretical 
negotiation strategies in a real-world context, the significant effect that a problem-solving 
strategy may lead both sides to make an agreement of investment in an alliance formation phase, 
has been successfully proven. Our finding also indicates that a compromising strategy based on 
mutual trust or transparent information sharing will also lead to a successful alliance in the 
formation phase, which has empirically complemented the dual concern model to some extent.  
 
Current studies of empirical assessment on effects of different negotiation strategies in the phase 
of alliances formation remain sparse. Our new findings of how fairness perception influences 
alliance formation are contributed to the research field of alliance formation by implementing 
fairness theory with three variables (property rights, control rights, and BATNA). Meanwhile, 
our study has empirically examined negotiation strategies by consistently stressing the 
importance of negotiation theory. Based on our new findings, a framework of the interaction 
between fairness perception and negotiation outcome in alliance formation based on fairness 
theory has been developed. In terms of the business world, our research can benefit entrepreneurs 
through a deeper understanding of how the negotiation process is performed and how VCs think 
during the process.    
6.2 Limitations of the study 
This research has empirically assessed negotiation strategies and their implementations in 
strategic alliance formation between the VC firms and start-up companies. This research has only 
found useful data on the problem-solving strategy and the compromising strategy, and lacks 
sufficient data on the contending strategy. No data has been retrieved on the yielding strategy. 
Therefore, their influence on alliance formation is unknown. While the fairness theory has been 
successfully applied to negotiations and their successful alliance formations, the time limitation 
did not allow an extensive research on which of the four fairness types are the most significant. 
Also, our research has only focused on the negotiation process from the VCs perspective. How 
the entrepreneurs perceive fairness has not been studied and are unknown in this research.  
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In addition, because of the short time span and tight budgets, the demographic for the interviews 
was narrowed down to Oslo only. As there are not many VC firms in Oslo and some VCs may 
not be willing to participate in our research, it was only possible to interview seven of the fifteen 
companies contacted. Furthermore, there were no access to important documents (term sheet and 
shareholder agreement) regarding the negotiations between VCs and entrepreneurs.  
 
The cases studied in this thesis were not ongoing and some of them occurred several years ago. 
Thus, it is inevitable that some interviewees may have forgotten certain details about their 
negotiations. The interview data was mainly obtained through the interviews with the venture 
capitalists and follow-up questions sent by emails. These limitations may be threats to the 
reliability of our research. 
 
While this thesis has its main focus on successful cases, minimal attention has been directed to 
the factors that may lead to unsuccessful outcomes.  
 
6.3 Future research 
Although this thesis may provide some contributions to the research field of strategic alliance 
formation by illustrating the interaction between fairness perception and the negotiation 
outcomes of making an agreement, there are still some research vacancies that need to be 
discussed by other researchers. Given that the research is a cross-sectional design, it was only 
able to assess cases that were closed and retold by the VCs, which can give room for subjectivity. 
Therefore, for future research a better approach could be to conduct a longitudinal study, giving 
the researchers the ability to follow real-time negotiations between VCs and entrepreneurs. In 
this way, the entire process from the first meeting to deal closing can be followed and 
documented with minimal data loss. Considering that it is not known how the entrepreneurs 
perceive fairness in our current research, a longitudinal study provides the opportunity to observe 
how VCs and entrepreneurs engage in negotiations and examine how they perceive fairness 
towards each other.   
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Qualitative techniques are suitable for our subject in the field of strategic alliance formation 
because it is too complex to be simply answered by yes or no. However, the qualitative data 
collected cannot be mathematically analyzed in the same comprehensive way as quantitative 
results; they can only provide us a general guide to the trend of new aspects in our research. 
Therefore, the future research may focus on mathematical analysis by using quantitative methods.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Venture capital investment process
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 Fried & Hisrich, Toward a Model of Venture Capital Investment Decision Making, 1994 
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Appendix 2: Alliance formation phases discovered by previous researcher
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 Source: Das & Teng (2002). “The dynamics of alliance conditions in the alliance development process” 
Management Decision 49(8): 1235-1256. 
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Appendix 3: Justice Measure Items
13
 
 
Measure item 
Source on which 
item is based 
Procedural justice  
The following items refer to the procedures used to arrive at your 
(outcome) 
 
1. Have you been able to express your views and feelings during 
those procedures? 
Thibaut & Walker 
(1975) 
2. Have you had influence over the (outcome) arrived at by those 
procedures? 
Thibaut & Walker 
(1975) 
3. Have those procedures been applied consistently? Leventhal (1980) 
4. Have those procedures been free of bias? Leventhal (1980) 
5. Have those procedures been based on accurate information? Leventhal (1980) 
6. Have you been able to appeal the (outcome) arrived at by those 
procedures? 
Leventhal (1980) 
7. Have those procedures upheld ethical and moral standards? Leventhal (1980) 
Distributive justice  
The following items refer to your (outcome).  
1. Does your (outcome) reflect the effort you have put into your 
work? 
Leventhal (1976) 
2. Is your (outcome) appropriate for the work you have completed? Leventhal (1976) 
3. Does your (outcome) reflect what you have contributed to the 
organization? 
Leventhal (1976) 
4. Is your (outcome) justified, given your performance Leventhal (1976) 
Interpersonal justice  
The following items refer to (the authority figure who enacted the 
procedure).  
 
1. Has (he/she) treated you in a polite manner? Bies & Moag (1986) 
2. Has (he/she) treated you with dignity? Bies & Moag (1986) 
3. Has (he/she) treated you with respect? Bies & Moag (1986) 
4. Has (he/she) refrained from improper remarks or comments? Bies & Moag (1986) 
Informational justice  
The following items refer to (the authority figure who enacted the 
procedure).  
 
1. Has (he/she) been candid in (his/her) communications with you? Bies & Moag (1986) 
2. Has (he/she) explained the procedures thoroughly? Bies & Moag (1986) 
3. Were (his/her) explanations regarding the procedures reasonable? Shapiro et al. (1994) 
4. Has (he/she) communicated details in a timely manner? Shapiro et al. (1994) 
5. Has (he/she) seemed to tailor (his/her) communications to 
individuals' specific needs? 
Shapiro et al. (1994) 
 
 
                                               
13
 Source: Colquitt, J. A., D. E. Conlon, et al. (2001). "Justice at the millennium: a meta-analytic review of 25 years 
of organizational justice research." Journal of applied psychology 86(3): 425. 
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Appendix 4: Question guide 
Question Guide  
(The following questions are related to one (specific) short term investment case) 
 
1. Brief introduction  
a) How did you find each other? Who was the representative in the process of 
negotiation? 
b) How much time did you spend on the entire process (from the first contact to 
contract signing)? 
 
2. When negotiating with the entrepreneur, did you use any kind of negotiation strategy? 
Can you describe the characteristics of the negotiation strategies? 
 
3. Have you ever experienced being dissatisfied with the entrepreneurial team? How did 
you solve this matter? 
 
4. Can you think of a couple of specific factors that (firmly) determined the final outcome 
of the negotiation? 
 
5. How much shares of ownership did you intend to get and what did you eventually agree 
on? Was there a big difference between the initial investment and the final agreement? 
 
6. Have you been able to express your views and feelings during those procedures? Have 
you had influence over the (outcome) arrived at by those procedures? Have those 
procedures been applied consistently?  
 
7. We think both trust and respect play critical roles when negotiating. What do you think of 
this opinion?     
 
8. What do you think of the communication efficiency between you and the entrepreneur? 
What was the normal response time for feedbacks between you and the entrepreneur? If 
you find the outcome of decision was wrong, did you blame yourself or others?   
 
9. Can you elaborate on an unsuccessful negotiation case and some key factors that affected 
the outcome? 
 
10. Let’s do a test to check what kinds of strategies you used (under academic definition). 
A. A concern for your firm’s own outcome and an equally salient concern for the 
other party’s  outcome  
B. A high concern for your own outcome accompanied by a low concern for the 
other party’s outcome 
C. A concern for other’s outcome is high and concern for your own outcome is low 
D. A moderate amount of concern for your own outcome as well as for the other 
party’s outcome
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Appendix 5: Overview of each case 
 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 Firm 5 Firm 6 Firm 7 
Background 
of 
VC firms 
Year of 
establishment 
2001 2001 2006 1996 1886 1985 2006 
Investment 
industry 
Energy 
IT  
Media 
Mobile 
Semi-
conductor 
Hardware 
Software 
Software 
ICT 
Electronics 
Semi-
conductors 
Life- 
Science 
Energy 
Clean-tech 
Industrial 
ICT 
Life- 
Science 
Clean-tech 
Industrial 
Oil-tech 
Marine-
tech 
Digital 
Infrastructu
re 
Media 
E-
Commerce- 
Platforms 
Energy  
IT 
Media 
Energy 
Life- 
Science 
oil/offshore 
ICT 
Life- 
Science 
oil/offshore 
Industrial 
Marine-
tech 
Media 
ICT 
oil/offshore 
renewable- 
energy 
No. funds 2 2 2 1 1 1 3 
 Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E Case F Case G 
One 
Specific 
Case 
How they found 
each other 
Met at 
conference 
The 
entreprene
ur came to 
VC 
The 
entreprene
ur sent an 
email to VC 
The VCs 
looked up 
the 
company  
Met at 
Connect 
forum 
The 
entreprene
ur 
contacted 
VC 
Network 
Representative Partner Partner Partner 
General 
Partner 
Partner Partner Partner 
Length of 
negotiation 
3-4 months 7 months 5 months 4-5 months 6 weeks 6 months 1 year 
Investment 
time 
2 years 3 years Unknown 3 years Unknown Unknown Unknown 
 
